

ARMS AND AMMUNITION:
Control and Inventory Management Procedures for Kenya Police Service

Wairagu F, Carlson K, Katana A, & Gioto V.
Edited by Ndung'u James

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CONTENTS

LIST OF ACRONYMS

ASTU	Anti-stock Theft Unit
BLR	Beyond Local Repair
CDF	Constituency Development Fund
CSA	Chief Service Armourer
DCI	Directorate of Criminal Investigations
DIG	Deputy Inspector General
GSU	General Service Unit
HQ	Headquarters
IG	Inspector General of Police
ISO	International Organization for Standardization
KWS	Kenya Wildlife Services
MP	Member of Parliament
NCO	Non-Commissioned Officer
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NIS	National Intelligence Service
NPS	National Police Service
OB	Occurrence Book
OCS	Officer Commanding Police Station
PSSM	Physical Security and Stockpile Management
PWBR	Provincial Workshop Record Book
RC	Regional Commander
RECSA	Regional Centre on Small Arms
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SCPC	Sub-County Police Commander
SSO	Service Standing Orders

Statement by Deputy Inspector General, Kenya Police Service

The Constitution of Kenya 2010, Article 243 establishes the National Police Service (NPS) consisting of Kenya Police Service and Administration Police Service. It requires the National Police Service to strive for the highest standards of professionalism and accountability. Accountable management of police-owned firearms is an integral part of NPS's day to day tasks. The National Police Service Standing Orders (SSO), the Firearms Act, and the National Police Service Act, contain provisions on how to manage and secure NPS's stockpiles of arms and ammunition. The NPS Standing Orders are particularly important in this regard as they include provisions on arms and ammunition procurement, distribution, transportation, storage, and on-charge issuance and collection.

Effective management of weapons and ammunition requires comprehensive planning in order to ensure that all activities related to this process work together as an integrated system. This is very important for a number of reasons which include: safety and security of both civilians and security personnel, safety of weapons and ammunition to avoid theft, loss or misuse and accountability. By improving stockpile management, risks associated with theft, loss, misuse or diversion are substantially minimised. In this regard, the National Police Service has a well-established system of record keeping and inventory management of arms and ammunition.

This research on arms and ammunition inventory management by the National Police Service provides important recommendations on how the Service can progressively ensure that its inventory management systems are not only impeccable but also sustain greater accountability in how arms are managed and used by the Service. It is in line with the National Police Service's commitment to offer leadership on research aimed at providing evidence-based input towards improving management practices in arms control. This research and the accompanying Essential Guide will go a long way in strengthening the NPS's capacity in physical security and stockpile management. Officers working in arms management sections will find the report and the Essential Guide as useful tools for their everyday work.

EDWARD N. MBUGUA, CBS, OGW, ndc(K)
DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL,
KENYA POLICE SERVICE

Statement by the Director, Kenya National Focal Point on Small Arms and Light Weapons

The Kenya National Focal Point on Small Arms and Light Weapons continues to play its key mandate of coordinating action to promote accountable practices in arms control and management. As a government agency, the KNFP continues to build capacities of key institutions in physical security and stockpile management in line with internationally established practices aimed at improving accountability in arms control and management.

The importance of accurate and maintained records of all SALW is recognised in all protocols and agreements relevant to SALW control, on the International, Regional and Sub-Regional level. The Nairobi protocol for example requires that States Parties establish and maintain complete national inventories of small arms and light weapons held by security forces and other state bodies, to enhance their capacity to manage and maintain secure storage of state-owned small arms and light weapons. It is therefore essential that a system is in place to manage the inventory of SALW and account for the stores.

All state stockpiles are subject to risks of theft and diversion. However, the risks are significantly reduced or mitigated when stockpiles are maintained effectively. Proper maintenance requires investments in infrastructure and professional capacity in addition to sustained commitment from government. The International Tracing Instrument commits all UN member states to specific marking and record-keeping standards and establishes common rules for tracing cooperation. With the signing of the Nairobi Protocol in 2004, Kenya committed itself to marking its national stockpiles of small arms and light weapons. The objective of this exercise was to ensure that any weapons found on the illicit market could be traced back to their original, legal owner through a unique identifying code. This measure is viewed as an essential precursor to controlling diversion.

This research was coordinated by the KNFP and draws from the experience of implementing a training programme for the National Police Service in Physical Security and Stockpile Management (PSSM) by the Kenya National Focal Point on Small Arms (KNFP) and Security Research and Information Centre (SRIC) with the support of REINVENT programme funded by the UK government. The recommendations provided will go a long way in further strengthening the already existing arms management practices within the National Police Service.

Charlton Murithi, EBS, OGW, ndc (K), SAIG, Director, KNFP

Acknowledgement

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We appreciate the support offered by the National Police Service by opening the doors to the sampled police stations. We appreciate the officers who took time to respond to our questionnaire and freely shared their knowledge and experience. We appreciate the research team comprised of Francis Wairagu, Khristopher Carlson, Dr. Victoria Gioto and Anthony Nderi for their diligence in undertaking the field studies and compiling this report. Thanks to James Ndung'u, Head of Technical Delivery, Police Reforms Lead and Amos Katana, Arms Officer KNFP for conceptualising and developing the initial draft and providing a technical review of the research. Thanks to the REINVENT Chief of Party Jaki Mbogo for the support and guidance received from the Programme Management and Leadership right from the review and approval of the study to its conclusion. Thanks go to the REINVENT Finance and Procurement team (John Njenga, Caroline Muthike, Doreen Gatwiri and Lilian Wanjugu) who professionally handled logistics for the research team. They are highly appreciated.

Executive summary

The National Police Service Standing Orders (SSO), the Firearms Act, and the National Police Service Act, are the key documents that guide the Kenya National Police Service on how to manage and secure its stockpiles of arms and ammunition. The NPS Standing Orders are particularly important in this regard as they include provisions on arms and ammunition procurement, distribution, transportation, storage, and on-charge issuance and collection. Responsibility to implement its provisions belongs to all officers; from the Inspector General down to newly deployed constables. This study was conducted to highlight experiences among NPS officers in implementing arms and ammunition management procedures and to learn from officers what challenges they encounter. In addition to understanding which methods to secure and manage arms and ammunition work best in accordance with the NPS Standing Orders.

Thirteen locations were visited for this study, including Bamburi, Bungoma, Garissa, Kilifi, Kasarani, Kiambu, Kisumu, Mombasa Central, Nairobi Central, Nakuru, Kisii and Nanyuki, in addition to the Nairobi Central Armoury and the police post in Ol Pejeta. Overall, the police stations visited appear to comply with the SSO's firearms management and control procedures, including protocols for the daily issuing and returning of on-charge firearms and ammunition held by officers, as well as several other important guidelines. Inventory record-keeping in all stations visited includes arms movement registers, use of daily strength disposition board, and duly filled P139 forms, and, as necessary, the GP 87, used to track all weapons and ammunition expenditure and movement between station.

While standard record-keeping practices were evident in all stations, several stations experienced challenges with physically managing stockpiles. One challenge reported by armoury managers was working within limited space inside congested armouries. Several stations visited had armouries that were old and initially constructed to cater for fewer officers than are currently retained; these included Bungoma, Mombasa Central, Kisumu, and Kiambu. In at least two stations, three-times as many officers are posted there today than were originally intended when the stations were first built. This means that as the number of on-site personnel has increased, the number of firearms in-store has also increased. In such cases, this has resulted in firearms being stored unsystematically. For example, the absence of metal racks, due to space limitations in some stations, means that firearms are being placed on bare floors, or in manners inconsistent with the SSOs. In addition, small armouries rarely have separate storage space for rifles and ammunition; both were observed to be placed immediately next to one another. As the number of firearms has increased, so, too, has the amount of ammunition in-store. This was found to hinder first-in first-out' issuance of ammunition.

It should be noted, however, that challenges to implement the first-in first-out principle are not always due to the size of armouries alone; it is, fundamentally, an ammunition management issue, and despite tight spaces inside armouries, boxes can be rearranged according to their age, however cumbersome the task may be. Regardless, small armouries create challenges that place an extra burden on the officers who manage them, and inadequate space is linked to ammunition expiring, and hence wasted, when it is not readily accessible to be used.

Training and annual shooting classifications were noted as the best ways to spend older stocks of ammunition. However, it was found that for most stations, scheduled-trainings happen irregularly for officers, including arms-usage exercises and shooting refresher courses; further contributing to ammunition exceeding its recommended shelf-life. In addition, the lack of trainings and shooting exercises means officers are less familiar with the operation and handling of firearms, particularly when new weapons types are introduced to officers that have not previously used them.

As armouries are the most secure area of the station and secured 24/7, non-firearm equipment is stored in armouries. Court exhibits, such as stolen goods, can further cramp the available space inside armouries. In such cases, the storage of 'other' items is obstructing officers' ability to comply with the arms and ammunition management provisions of the SSO. Alternative storage for non-police equipment, such as court exhibits, would help alleviate congestion and enhance observance of SSO procedures.

In several cases, steel arms-storage boxes are being used to secure arms in stations; these boxes can add to floor-congestion and obstruct access to other stored equipment. Some police stations have addressed this issue by placing steel boxes (with equipment inside) at the station's reception area, outside of the armory store. Though under 24/7 guard, this does not comply with the order that all firearms be kept inside a locked armory (when an armoury is on-site).

The shortage of requisite forms and registers was also reported. Some stations are not using official P139 forms, and others had experienced delays in replenishing register books. In these instances, officers are improvising with unofficial notebooks or sheets of paper to maintain daily records.

In Nakuru, it was noted that the Armourer Circuit Unit had created a new document to fill the gap in the management of handling arms-for-repair. A 'workshop receipt' designed to verify delivery of arms in disrepair and for pick-up was found necessary to complete record-keeping and accounting of the arms-for-repair process. It was also reported that repair workshops lack the modern equipment needed to perform some types of repair work.

During site visits, the wildlife conservancy (Ol Pejeta) presented one of the best cases for armoury management. The armoury is an underground bunker with a single entrance secured with a metal door. The internal temperature is regulated, and firearm racks were well established. All arms in the armoury were secured with a chain and lock, and the daily strength disposition board was regularly updated, as required. Further, rifles and ammunition were stored in separate areas of the armoury. The Garissa armoury was another that exemplified optimal management of arms and ammunition[1].

To address the gaps and challenges identified in this study, an audit of all armouries in the country can be undertaken to provide a full picture of the scope and magnitude of gaps and challenges stations are experiencing in arms and ammunition management and security. Old armouries should be renovated, or new ones constructed, to address space challenges that hinder compliance with the SSOs. Future armouries should meet the

Arms display during an arms destruction even by the NPS

stipulated security and space management requirements and be built to accommodate future expansion and growth of stations' personnel.

There is a need to adopt electronic recordkeeping[2] for firearms and ammunition to secure the records and align with the newly established electronic occurrence book. This calls for computer and information technology management capacity-building for all armoury officers.

There is a need to strengthen the capacity of the departments responsible for arms management within the NPS to ensure that the detailed procedures are followed and adequately implemented. Regular and scheduled training on firearms competencies

[1]Not all armouries were observed during station visits. As such, the identification of the Ol Pejeta and Garissa armouries as exemplary is not an indication that the other armouries were poorly managed, but instead this should be understood to indicate that these armouries were both well-managed and well-constructed.
[2]Nanyuki police station, one of those supported by REINVENT has an evolving electronic arms register which is a good example of how this could be scaled up in other stations.

will also ensure better use of old ammunition. To ensure serviceability of weapons, the existing regional Armourer Circuit Units should be modernised, better equipped and personnel increased to address repair and maintenance work at the local levels.

More attention should be paid in safeguarding the criteria for need and suitability assessment for civilian firearms licensing to ensure that only those meeting the strict criteria are allowed to possess arms. Developing strict guidelines for civilian use of firearms is critical to ensure that civilian holders are more responsible, accountable and know the consequences of misuse of firearms. Similarly, "temporary permits to possess" arms should be discouraged as they present a significant risk to misuse of firearms by civilians.

Finally, CSA office should be supported to enhance its capacity to undertake regular checks of armouries to quickly address emerging challenges and establish an award or recognition for officers who are diligent in the management and servicing of stockpiles under their custody.

Introduction

The function of police is to provide security, maintain public order and safety, and prevent and investigate criminal activities. The performance of these roles often requires officers to bear arms to protect themselves and others, and to effectively enforce Kenyan laws. Within this scope of duty, police officers – and the National Police Service on the whole – take on an important responsibility to ensure that the arms stockpiles entrusted to them are managed in accordance with established norms and procedures and are maintained securely to safeguard police-held arms from loss or theft.

Kenya is a signatory and state party to both regional and international arms-control instruments. Two of these instruments, the Nairobi Declaration and the Nairobi Protocol, define stockpile management as 'the control and management, in all its aspects, of small arms and light weapons in state and non-state possession.'[3] Thus, stockpile management encompasses a broad range of management aspects, including record keeping, safe storage, maintenance, refurbishment, and disposal of obsolete small arms and light weapons stockpiles. Collectively, the elements that comprise the control and management of arms stockpiles, including firearms, ammunition and explosives, is generally referred to as physical security and stockpile management (PSSM).

PSSM also entails the determination of stockpile size, types of stockpiles, location of stockpiles, and the management of ammunition in service.[4] Effective PSSM requires comprehensive planning to ensure that activities related to stockpile management work together as an integrated system[5].

All state stockpiles are subject to the risks of diversion, theft and loss. However, these risks are significantly reduced when stockpiles are maintained effectively. Although individual officers have a role in PSSM, government institutions are instrumental in providing

[3] RECSA, Best Practice Guideline for the Implementation of the Nairobi Declaration and the Nairobi Protocol on Small Arms and Light Weapons http://www.poa-iss.org/RegionalOrganizations/RECSA/Nairobi%20Best%20Practice%20Guidelines.pdf

[4] Saferworld, Stockpile Management - https://www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/SALW-module-9.pdf

[5] Small Arms Survey, Conventional Ammunition in Surplus http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/D-Book-series/book-05-Conventional-Ammo/SAS-Conventional-Ammunition-in-Surplus-Book-10-Chapter-8.pdf

necessary resources and guidance to ensure PSSM is effectively implemented. Proper PSSM requires investments in infrastructure and professional capacity, in addition to sustained commitments to provide oversight and accountability to ensure arms are managed effectively and used responsibly. As such, a proper framework to coordinate all aspects of PSSM, from coordination among government ministries down to local police posts' arms-storage infrastructure.

The main legal framework regulating record-keeping procedures includes the National Police Service Act, the Firearms Act, and the National Police Service Standing Orders (SSOs).

Available data from government documents, inter-governmental reports, NGO and academic literature demonstrates that the majority of illicit arms and ammunition in circulation began as licit material in possession of state governments or other authorised entities (e.g., licensed civilians). However, through various methods, either deliberate or accidental, legal arms and ammunition are either diverted, lost, stolen or otherwise leaked to unauthorized holders. It is therefore important that government institutions in legally authorised custodianship of such material secure and maintain stockpiles under their jurisdiction. A PSSM framework assists in the achievement of this objective.

The Kenyan government has taken positive steps in the area of PSSM. With support from various partners including the Regional Centre on Small Arms (RECSA), achievements include regular PSSM training among state security agencies, including the National Police Service (NPS). Other achievements include over 98 per cent of state-held weapons have been marked, remote areas of the country have been provided secure storage facilities including steel boxes, and a number of armouries have been upgraded. The sustainability of these achievements is supported with strong national-inventory management and tracking capability.

The National Police Service an elaborate record keeping system, with well established procedures and processes to maintain inventories. The main legal framework regulating record-keeping procedures includes the National Police Service Act, the Firearms Act, and the National Police Service Standing Orders (SSOs). All arms and ammunition for the National Police Service are supplied according to personnel establishment and their scale of issue cannot be varied without the approval of the Inspector General of Police.[6] The Chief Service Armorer, for example, is required to keep an up-to-date record of the location of all firearms, with this information maintained by the arms records section at service HQs by means of quarterly arms returns from formations or sub-counties, and the annual arms census. The following registers are maintained by the National Police

[6] Chapter 14 of the SSOs

Service and form part of the NPS's record keeping system: Arms Movement Registers, Daily Strength Disposition Board, Daily Arms Check P139 and Arms Register GP 87. These records and experiences in maintaining them in police stations in Kenya are featured within this report.

Purpose of the study

The Reducing Insecurity and Violent Extremism in Northern and Coastal Regions of Kenya programme (REINVENT) has been supporting NPSPSSM training with the aim of improving arms management practices. In addition to the training, REINVENT supported the NPS to develop electronic arms registers, namely in Laikipia, Baringo, Samburu, and West Pokot. While the NPS has elaborate legal and regulatory provisions guiding its management of arms, these documents are not presented in an easy-to-use format that would allow police commanders and other officers to grasp the bigger picture of arms management beyond their workstations. Therefore, the purpose of this study was to assess existing NPS practices in arms and ammunition management among a selected number of stations[7] and understand the extent to which practices reflect the legal and regulatory provisions covering the processes and protocols of arms management.

Methodology

This study began with a literature review of legal documents and policy frameworks, including the National Police Service Standing Orders, the National Police Service Act 2011 and the Firearms Act. United Nations guidelines and regional instruments such as the Nairobi Protocol implementation guidelines and the Modular Small-Arms-Control Implementation Compendium (MOSAIC) were also reviewed.

Key informant interviews were conducted in selected locations,[8] including with the Chief Service Armorers' office, Sub-County Police Commanders (SCPC), Officers Commanding Police Stations (OCS) and Officers in charge of armouries at police stations and one wildlife conservancy.

> *This report presents data and findings on experiences in selected police stations in arms and ammunition management, including implementation of policies and procedures.*

[7] The study covered selected police stations in Coast, Rift Valley, Nairobi, Central, Western, North Eastern, Eastern and Nyanza.

[8] Visited stations included Bamburi, Bungoma, Garissa, Kilifi, Kasarani, Kiambu, Kisumu, Mombasa Central, Nairobi Central, Nakuru, and Nanyuki, in addition to the Nairobi Central Armoury and police post in Ol Pejeta.

Qualitative data collected from interviews was analysed and supplemented with further calls to respondents for clarifications when necessary. Observational data included site conditions of armouries, general management and appearance of arms and ammunition inside armories where entry was granted.

This report presents data and findings on experiences in selected police stations in arms and ammunition management, including implementation of policies and procedures. It highlights unique practices and challenges in specific stations, as well as common challenges and practices found across all visited sites. The report contains recommendations from respondents, and analysis and recommendations from the research team.

Personnel Roles

Chief Service Armorer (CSA)

Under the guidance of the Deputy Inspector General (DIG), the CSA is responsible for arms and ammunition needs assessments, procurement, storage, distribution, maintenance, and regular and impromptu inspections in the service. Needs are derived from evaluating restructuring or recruitment numbers of service members. Prevailing security situations in some areas may also require additional equipment needs which is assessed by the CSA's office. Once needs are assessed, the CSA responds to stations' replenishment requests, considering the natural deterioration of old stocks in use. The procurement of arms and ammunition follows government procedures for acquisition of security equipment.

When a consignment of new equipment arrives, the service arms store – under the supervision of the CSA – undertakes a physical inspection of the new arms and ammunition and enters each into a master ledger book. The ledger book captures the type, model, calibre, and serial number of firearms. Under the 'remarks' section, operational status of the firearm is noted. The service arms store in-charge ensures that for ammunition, the first-in first-out principle is followed. Arms and ammunition distribution to stations is initiated through a request from Sub-County Police Commanders (SCPC), or counterpart officers within other formations such as the General Service Unit (GSU), Anti-Stock Theft Unit (ASTU), Directorate of Criminal Investigations (DCI), Border Patrol Unit, or others according to regulations.

In executing their maintenance role, the CSA oversees Armoury Circuit Units, comprised of technicians responsible for regular inspection and repair of arms. These Units serve police stations within their designated area of coverage, in addition to assisting other law enforcement agencies, as required.

Regarding arms and ammunition accountability, the CSA receives quarterly and annual census reports on arms and ammunition from all arms accounting units in the country. When need arises, the CSA may conduct a spontaneous inspection of any unit or station's armoury to ensure compliance with the Standing Orders.

> *This report presents data and findings on experiences in selected police stations in arms and ammunition management, including implementation of policies and procedures.*

SCPC (Sub-County Police Commander)

The Sub-County Police Commanders are accountable to the CSA for all arms and ammunition within a SCPC's jurisdiction. SCPC's are responsible for requesting additional arms and ammunition to their respective areas of command. The requests are captured on form S12 (Demand and Issue Voucher), a form that is directed to the Deputy Inspector General. The SCPC uses the GP87 (arms register) to record all arms received from the CSA, and further records any firearms or ammunition forwarded to stations and posts under their jurisdiction (facilitated with an S12 form). The SCPC is also responsible for the quarterly and annual inspection of firearms and ammunition in all stations under their jurisdiction.

> *In executing their maintenance role, the CSA oversees Armoury Circuit Units, comprised of technicians responsible for regular inspection and repair of arms.*

OCS (Officer Commanding Police Station)

The OCS is the custodian of arms and ammunition within their jurisdiction. The OCS is required to fill the P 139 form daily and attach it to the occurrence book (OB). The distribution and collection of arms is entrusted to the officer in-charge of the station armoury.

Officer in charge of armoury

The station armorer is responsible for issuance and collection of arms and ammunition by officers according to duty roster. They use the armoury register to record the issuance with each officer signing out any firearm and ammunition issued. The same process is repeated on return. They ensure that firearms are cleaned before accepting them back into the armoury.

Arms and Ammunition Storage, Control and Management: Experiences and Challenges

Armouries

Officers interviewed expressed a number of issues with regard to armouries, both at their own stations and others operating within common jurisdictions, including armoury size and space allocations, design, and fittings (e.g., firearms racks). With regard to overall management and security of armouries, the general impression among the research team was that the daily issuance of service firearms is manageable, and armouries' physical structures were reported to be secure from unauthorised access. However, environmental hazards such as water leakage were not identified as risks to armouries' structural integrity, or to equipment within. Firearms and ammunition within coastal armouries are particularly susceptible to high humidity, presenting unique challenges in maintaining firearms functionality.

The challenges identified with regard to armouries' physical features are resolvable, and if addressed, will enhance stations' day-to-day management of firearms and ammunition, including the provision of practical equipment, such as desk-top space to more easily work with arms registers and perform other essential paperwork. Overall, the primary concern at most stations was that armouries are too small, in addition to several armouries falling short of standard construction specifications.

> *In some cases, markings were no longer legible due to excessive rusting and vigorous cleaning necessary to remove and prevent rust build-up.*

Construction

Officers expressed concerns with station construction and armoury design. One challenge experienced in two different locations visited was linked to the exclusion of senior police officers' input into the design and construction-planning phase of stations, and by extension to that, armouries. Where stations and armouries were designed without consultation with OCS and other senior officers, construction resulted in armouries not meeting basic requirements as set out in the SSOs, including size, floor-plan design, and construction material.[9] It was noted that CDF-funded stations were a concern, with final decisions made on station

[9] See Chapter 14, "Arms and Ammunition", paragraph 14.(1-4) of the National Police Service Standing Orders.

design and construction without police consultation and approval. It was suggested that all construction plans be cleared with the IG, and when designs are approved at this level, should construction take place; this includes location selection for stations.

Among the cited cases in which senior officers were not consulted prior to construction, some station armouries lacked basic features such as concrete ceilings – a standard material for any armoury.[10] One officer put it bluntly, saying that the security and safety of firearms should be paramount with regard to general construction, but stressed that this is not always the case. Instances where armouries did not meet the minimum standards as set out in the Standing Orders were linked to the involvement of some well-wishers funding, indicating responsibility is on local decision-makers in the design and construction process to consult with senior police officers.

However, officers expressed appreciation for support from politicians to build stations, with one officer stating that collaboration with an MP – formerly with the Administration Police – sponsored the building of a quality station. This experience was successful, resulting in a station and armoury meeting construction standards. In this case, the MP worked closely with senior NPS officers during the stations design phase, ensuring that, among other examples, proper ventilation and standard wall material were included.

Among the armouries observed during this study, all shared common characteristics that can be taken into consideration for future armoury design (or renovation of existing structures). In all cases, armoury entrances were adjacent to the holding-cell entrances, posing a clear risk should any person(s) be taken into police custody find their way into an open armoury door while being placed into, or taken out of, the holding cell. The rationale for this arrangement is that both the armoury and holding-cell should be under 24-hour guard, making the enclosed space behind the barred police station reception area a suitable location for both. Naturally, stations have protocols in place to avoid both entrances being open simultaneously, but this risk remains present, and is easily mitigated with redesigned floorplans for future stations.

> *Congested armouries pose impediments to swift issuance of arms and ammunition in case of emergency.*

Coastal armouries were noted to be experiencing unique challenges in maintaining older firearms, particularly G3 and AK-types due to high humidity in these areas. These armouries, like most in Kenya, are not equipped with climate-control[11] mechanisms to manage humidity levels, requiring

[10] The reference made to an inadequately-built armoury ceiling was mentioned to be in Marsabit county and was not observed by the study team.

[11] See Chapter 14, "Arms and Ammunition", paragraph 1.(3)(b) of the National Police Service Standing Orders.

vigilant attention from officers to upkeep firearms' physical condition, particularly for firearms not regularly used. In addition to operability concerns, officers noted that rusting metal,accelerated by high humidity, interferes with markings on firearms, such as marks on receivers of G3s. In some cases, markings were no longer legible due to excessive rusting and vigorous cleaning necessary to remove and prevent rust build-up. Humidity and rust were also suspected to negatively impact the quality of ammunition, as stated by informants in coastal stations.

In some cases, markings were no longer legible due to excessive rusting and vigorous cleaning necessary to remove and prevent rust build-up.

Interior lay-out and space concerns

In standard security procedures, it is advisable not to store firearms and their ammunition together. However, among the armouries observed, only two armouries stored ammunition separately from stored firearms. It was seen that in most armouries, maintaining a separation of arms from ammunition was not possible due to the small size of armouries and the congestion of equipment within them. In several cases, armouries are single-room units without partitions to physically separate ammunition and firearms, and, with one exception, there was no underground storage space in which ammunition could be placed. Further, not all armouries are sufficiently equipped with steel boxes with which additional security and safety could be provided for stored ammunition.[12] In several stations, ammunition boxes were stacked together in one spot, with firearms kept immediately next to stored ammunition. This arrangement made it necessary for officers to step over, or around, ammunition to access firearms, or vice versa. In the armoury with underground ammunition-storage space, it was observed that this was only accessible by lifting heavy materials off the floor-hatch as the armoury was too congested to easily gain unfettered access to the stored ammunition below.

Congested armouries pose impediments to swift issuance of arms and ammunition in case of emergency. It was noted that newer ammunition is often issued before older ammunition because older supplies are inaccessible, either obstructed behind other equipment, or its location simply unknown because the overall organisation of equipment and material is unkept.

Counter and desk-top space was not present within some armouries, complicating the ease at which officers could otherwise make daily entries into registers and record

[12] See Chapter 14, "Arms and Ammunition", paragraph 1.(3)(a) and paragraph 5.(1), of the NPS Standing Orders. International standards call for ammunition and firearms to be stored separately when secured within armouries.

firearms and ammunition movement. Issuing firearms in such conditions is rendered "awkward", as one officer described it, requiring him to simultaneously handle a firearm with one hand and an arms movement book in the other, he said. In Kilifi, the lack of racks presented a challenge, but has been addressed in an ad-hoc manner with modified wooden bookshelves being used to stand rifles upright. In another armoury, ammunition was stored on similar wooden shelving to keep ammunition boxes raised off the ground and in effort to maintain some semblance of organisation.[13]

In all cases, officers raised issue with the size of armouries for both their own station and other stations they were familiar with. Officers stated on numerous occasions that old armouries can no longer accommodate the amount of equipment stored within them; this includes firearms and ammunition, in addition to other equipment such as flak jackets, helmets, grenades, tear-gas, condemned weapons or firearms in disrepair, among other materials requiring secure storage. In several cases, officers cited that 'older' stations have not been renovated since originally built (dating back 60+ years); as the number of police officers in these stations has increased over time, the number of firearms and other equipment has increased. The Bungoma south station, for example, was originally built to accommodate 85 officers, but today has more than 270. In other stations, interviewees reported that materials and equipment that should be in the armoury were kept outside of it, such as tear-gas canisters, as space limitations did not allow for storage in the armoury.

Some armouries are used by multiple law enforcement units, including the Tourist Police and the DCI, putting a premium on available space within them. In Bamburi, for example, the single-room armoury, roughly three-square meters in size, is used by both NPS and Tourist Police officers, making space management a challenge, and requiring coordination of when units' officers will access the armoury to avoid bottlenecks. In Bungoma, space limitations are supplemented with steel boxes kept outside of the armoury and stored in the report office.

> *There is a thorough handover process from one SCPC to another or from a station commander to another when transfers occur or replacements for any other reason.*

Absence of armouries

All stations visited for this study had permanent armouries, but concerns were expressed over stations and posts that do not have permanent storage structures. This is relatively common in rural areas, but it was noted that this is also an issue for urban stations. One example cited was Kihoto station in the Central Business District of Nairobi. Officers operating out of this station are required to check-out and return firearms at the Central Station armoury as

[13] See Chapter 14, "Arms and Ammunition", paragraph 5.(2). and paragraph 9.(e) of the NPS Standing Orders.

Kihoto does not have one of its own. Such circumstances interfere with officers duties and create undue congestion at the Central Station as officers from other stations are dependent upon this common armoury.

All police stations visited use steel boxes to store at least some firearms that are not in use. Interviewees expressed concern, however, with regard to police posts in, as per one example, Laikipia, where rural stations do not have secured armouries and where storage of weapons is managed with steel boxes only. It was noted that such posts are at higher risk of external threat and permanent structures purposed to secure arms would be a welcomed improvement to enhance firearms and ammunition security.

Procurement (needs assessment, requests)

The procurement of weapons and ammunition is undertaken by NPS headquarters in line with government rules and procedures concerning security equipment. Among visited stations, the processes in place to procure and transfer firearms and ammunition from the service central stores appear to be harmonious with standard protocols as stipulated in the SSOs. There are, however, some considerations to note that can further support stations in their efforts to procure equipment.

The process of requesting new weapons and ammunition is initiated with a written letter to the SCPC in charge of the jurisdiction indicating the specific firearms and ammunition needs of a requesting station. The SCPC will then prepare an S12 form and submit it in six copies to Police Headquarters and the Chief Service Armorer for review and consideration. The authority to approve requests is through the DIG office. With the DIG's authority to proceed, requesting stations are notified of what has been approved from the initial S12 and the details are forwarded to the Central Arms Stores to organise the approved equipment and prepare it for pick-up.[14] Four copies of the approved S12 (signed and stamped) are attached to the transferred equipment forwarded to the final destination.[15] It is the responsibility of the requesting station to organise the logistics of transferring the approved weapons and ammunition. On receipt of the stores at the destination, one copy of the S12 returns



[14] The Central Armoury reports that all arms are marked with RECSA standard codes before transferred to stations.

[15] The S12 provides for the several designations to maintain coherence of the S12 requesting process, numbered 1-6 and are as follows: (1) Remains at the store; (2-3) Originally from the sub county commander who will send the officer for filing. Remain in the firl for reference; (4-5) Remain at headquarters at specific office for filing (e.g., armorer); and (6) Remain in the book.

to the CSA as a confirmation that the firearms or ammunition were received. This process, as described by officers, appears standard across stations with no concerns cited in the arrangements in place to facilitate requests.

All interviews confirmed that the station OCS typically makes the initial request to the SCPC by describing what is needed, including quantity of firearms (or ammunition), types to replace, and justification for the request. Officers commanding police stations are responsible for supply of firearms and ammunitions to posts and patrol bases under them. Depending on the inventory of firearms and ammunition at a main police station armoury, the request from other stations and posts may be swift to deliver and a process to transfer the firearms and ammunition from an adjoining police station armoury. Records of all arms and ammunition within a police division are kept at the divisional headquarters and OCS's keep records of arms and ammunition issued to their stations. There is a thorough handover process from one SCPC to another or from a station commander to another when transfers occur or replacements for any other reason. On the side of taking over of arms and ammunition, a physical check and confirmation and counting of stockpiles is done.

The Central Armoury in Nairobi is mandated to oversee the fulfillment of approved requests and determine which to prioritise based on requesting stations' needs for increased strength and timely replacement of firearms. It was reported that high-risk areas (e.g., Mandera) are prioritised over low-risk areas (e.g., Kiambu). In Garissa, it was reported that replacements for condemned weapons were furnished relatively quickly. However, for stations designated as low-risk areas, officers expressed concern that their requests typically take longer than anticipated, presumably for reasons linked to availability of equipment and other factors including the order in which priority areas are served first. In addition, some stations expressed frustration that requests for new and modern firearms types, were not being approved for their stations, and typically receive only older firearms (e.g., G3s) as replacements for condemned ones. (See section on 'Maintenance' for details concerning the P81 Condemnation Certificate).

On the side of taking over of arms and ammunition, a physical check and confirmation and counting of stockpiles is done.

A senior officer noted that a majority of the firearms used for daily patrols are outdated G3 and AK-types. He noted that several of the firearms on his charge have problems and reliability is 'not guaranteed', and they need urgent replacement. He is hopeful that new weapon types will be provided but appeared to have

limited optimism that they would make it to his station. If firearms management systems were digitised, requesting officers could see status updates to their requests, providing real-time information including the prioritisation of station requests.[16]

In some instances, officers expressed concern that their stations do not have enough firearms. In one station visited, it was noted that should there be a situation where every officer needs a firearm, not every officer has access to one. As weapons age, the issue gains importance as the older weapons in the station's inventory become inoperable. Further, officers expressed a need for more concealable weapons types to counter gang-related activity; with a concealed firearm for undercover officers, there is less risk of theft through the targeting of an officer openly carrying a rifle.

In some instances, officers expressed concern that their stations do not have enough firearms.

Concerning the procurement of spare parts, a technician with the Armourer Circuit Unit said he makes requests through the S12 demand and issue voucher, in the same manner an SCPC would request firearms or ammunition. The armourer submits the voucher to the Central Armoury in Nairobi by email, and when indicated that parts are ready to be picked up, he may go personally to Nairobi to collect spares. This happens once or twice a year. (See the 'Maintenance' section for more details of the Armourer Circuit Unit.)

Inventory Management

Daily Checks and Movement of Firearms

Among the stations visited, all follow standardised inventory management practices as outlined within the SSOs. However, in a few cases, special circumstances dictate that stations operate in an extraordinary manner beyond 'normal' procedures; but in cases noted, stations nonetheless appeared to maintain an optimal level of accountability and oversight of firearms and ammunition.

All records related to the management of arms inventories, including arms movement registers, daily arms checks (P139), arms registers (GP 87) and civilian arms registers, are maintained manually. There were a few cited examples of digitised forms being used, (e.g., the P 80A weapons-technician inspection form) by Armourer Circuit Unit personnel.

[16] Escort of firearms is described within the SSO.16 Details of stations transport experiences are described in this report's "Stockpile Security and Maintenance" section further below. See also Chapter 14, "Arms and Ammunition", paragraph 28.(1)(a) of the NPS Standing Orders

Not all stations operate with the same record-keeping material resources, but where resources on-hand may be less than ideal, stations still appeared able to maintain inventories in line with the general provisions of the SSOs. In one example, a station did not have P139 forms, thus requiring an improvised solution. In another situation, operating within a high-risk environment, it created a site-specific plan to manage daily arms checks and movement registries in order to accommodate for a 24-hour stand-by force.

Several officers described the challenges posed by reliance on manual records. Challenges included difficultly in locating historical entries (when exact dates are not recalled), and cumbersome storing of large amounts of registers within space-limited armouries. Stations reported maintaining some registers and records for a period of 10 years or longer. They further indicated both manual and electronic storage can be embraced as the manual GP87 register is phased out gradually as a permanent record.

In general, stations reported that in addition to daily returns by the OCS (which they post in the OB), monthly returns are completed by the OCS and a copy provided to the SCPC. Quarterly returns are forwarded by the SCPC to headquarters; annual returns are compiled and sent to NPS headquarters. The information contained in monthly returns were said to include types and caliber of firearms held, total number of firearms and the start of the month, number total received in the month period, and ammunition expended during the month.

NPS ARMS INVENTORY MANAGEMENT

ESTABLISHMENT OF NEEDS AT POLICE STATIONS AND FORMATION DETACHMENTS

- Increase in personnel
- Replacements
- New security needs

REQUEST THROUGH FORM S12 TO DIG THROUGH

- Formation Commanders
- Sub-County Police Commanders

CONSIDERATION BY DIG THROUGH CHIEF SERVICE ARMOURER

- Is the need justifiable?
- Are there stocks for requested items?

ONCE APPROVED

- Confirmation
- Plan escort for the requisition
- Collect from the Service Central Stores

ENTRY TO ARMS MOVEMENT REGISTER GP87 AT HEADQUARTERS

- As per approved S12 Forms

ENTRY TO GP87

- At the Sub-County
- Formations
- Police Stations

DAILY AND REGULAR ISSUANCE AND COLLECTION

- Police Stations –armouries
- Formations – armouries and detachments
- Civilian arms register - Form 18 – maintains records of arms/ammunition under police custody for specified period

STOCKPILE SECURITY

MARKING

- Unique marking for NPS firearms using international/regional standardization marks

STORAGE

- Robust armouries of specific floorplans
- Lock and key - one kept with the OCS, the other with the officer in charge of the armoury
- 24/7 security
- Mandatory provision of security of arms and ammunition in transit
- Loss of arms or ammunition subject to inquiry/investigation

CLEANING AND MAINTENANCE AT POLICE STATIONS

- Daily cleaning on return to armoury
- Scheduled general cleaning and servicing

INSPECTIONS AND CHECKS

- Technical inspection after procurement
- Quarterly inspection
- Impromptu spot checks
- Armourer inspection reports – form P80A
- Annual arms census

REPAIRS AND MAINTENANCE

- By regional Arms Circuit Centre at the central firearms stores

DISPOSAL

- Armourer Circuit Unit must endorse a P81, marking "BLR" (beyond local repair)
- Non repairable are retained for subsequent Board of Survey action & decommissioned by central firearms stores including through destruction.

NPS reserve officers undergoing training on general cleaning and maintenance of arms

Finally, these returns state the end balance of all equipment and any accompanying remarks relevant to the past one month.

Arms Movement Register

An arms movement register is maintained daily at all stations visited, used to record, and monitor daily issue of firearms and ammunition among officers deployed on duties. It was noted that the registers are sufficient for the task required and when asked, officers were well aware of its function, importance and the needed information to be registered on a daily basis. Stations reported that the OCS regularly inspects the Arms movement Book; SCPCs make similar inspection but with less regularity, usually when they visits the station.

Occasionally a station will exhaust its supply of arms movement registers, this has been due to a delayed re-supply or collection from headquarters. Requisition of the arms movement register, and other arms records and forms is normally done by the SCPC. In one case, it was noted that an A4 notebook was improvised to serve as an arms movement register until official supplies were received. Some stations noted a possibility to borrow a new book from a neighbouring station.

Typically, an arms movement register will fill up in a short time, depending on the number of officers and transactions made in a day (three weeks, as noted for a station of 120 officers). One officer noted that with the vast number of entries made over a series of months, referring back to specific date or an officer's collection and return of a firearm is cumbersome and time consuming. He noted that a digitised system could make this much more efficient for both referencing purposes and verification of movements. With manual registers, there are no back-ups should the original be damaged or go missing.

Officers also noted that ammunition is counted manually, piece by piece in some cases (but not all), with each officer signing off for that day of use of the firearm and ammunition. If less than one round of ammunition is returned, this is noted in the arms movement register and indicated into the Occurrence Book (OB) (see section on ammunition below).

BOX 1: Garissa stand-by force

There is a stand-by force in Garissa, initially established following the attack at Garissa University in 2015. The stand-by force does not collect or deposit weapons daily at the station. Instead, weapons are maintained by officers of the force constantly. However, each member of the standby force is required to come into the station each week, and during this visit the firearm is checked by the station's officer in charge of the armoury. The serial number, number of ammunition pieces, serviceability of the firearm is all noted, and it is cleaned before the firearm is cleared to go back out of the station with the stand-by force officer. If an officer of this unit misses a weekly visit, then the armourer will call that officer or physically go to where that officer is to verify the weapons status, and count ammunition. However, this latter situation has never happened, and officers have maintained their regular schedules of weekly visits.

Daily Strength Disposition Board

All stations for which armouries were observed had a daily strength disposition board and all officers interviewed were familiar with its purpose and the information maintained on it. One concern expressed with the disposition boards was their size, and in one instance, it was excessively large for the limited space in which it was positioned inside the armory, but it wasn't evident where it could go otherwise as other equipment was placed in front of the board, obstructing its view. There is need to digitise the whole functioning of the daily strength disposition board. The disposition boards, normally updated with a chalk, caused challenges for stations in keeping the board clean and information legible. All boards observed include permanently printed names of firearms types, meaning that in several cases words are crossed out and new firearms types overwritten; in some cases, paper was taped over firearms types no longer present with new weapons types hand-written.

None of the daily strength disposition boards observed have a column for ammunition, as stipulated within the NPS Standing Order, [17] but it was regularly noted among stations that this was captured in P139s.

Daily Arms Check (P139)

The P139 form, used to keep record of a station's daily disposition of arms, is used among all stations visited, with each noting that P139s are entered into the OB each day. However, there were some challenges noted concerning the availability of P139 forms. Some stations reported that the forms were not always on-hand, with one station improvising a solution by using notebook paper, something it had been doing for over one year. In another station, it was noted that getting the form was particularly difficult, and, as it is not available to download and print, the concern centered on the forms complete unavailability in hardcopy form. Manually creating the forms has led to situations where the form is not complete, but instead may only include officers' names, date, weapon on charge and confirmed return of weapon. Otherwise, stations reported that OCS checks P139s with regularity.

Not all stations reported that the OCS reviews the P139 daily, however, but some did. No station reported that P139s were managed in a format other than manual form.



[17] See Chapter 14, "Arms and Ammunition", paragraph 16 of the NPS Standing Orders

Arms Registries (GP 87)

All stations reported using the GP 87, used to track all weapons and ammunition expenditure and movement between stations. The SCPC and OCS were cited as the authority to confirm the accuracy of GP 87 data.

It was noted that GP 87 data for any one station should be in line with the total number of arms and ammunition issued to the particular station. It was also noted that ammunition is tracked with the GP 87. One respondent gave an example of a time returning excess weapons to headquarters, and on another occasion redistributed weapons among the stations within his jurisdiction. There were no concerns or suggested changes to this form made among the stations visited.

Managing ammunition

There were differences in how stations account for ammunition on a daily basis, but otherwise all procedures were as stipulated within the NPS Standing Orders appeared to be followed.

Daily checks of ammunition

Armoury officers' methods to check ammunition-returns each day varied. Some remove ammunition from magazines completely to conduct a piece-by-piece count, while others, in contrast, simply use a system of pressing on the top cartridge to see if there is compression of the magazine spring, indicating that one or more cartridges are missing. Naturally, there is some risk involved in only pressing the top bullet of a magazine to check that it is full. Should a spent cartridge, for example, be used to replace a live bullet at the bottom of the magazine, this could go undetected. There is need for harmonisation across all stations on the checking of the ammunition returns.

Issuance of ammunition

Normally the issuance of ammunition should be on a first-in first-out basis, but some stations noted that in congested armouries, this is not always the case. If newer ammunition was easier to access, it would often make its way into the daily circulation of officers' firearms before older supplies could be exhausted. Issuance of ammunition can be digitised.

> *If negligence is found to be the cause of the loss, the responsible officer could stand to be taken to court or dealt with administratively, and possibly fined according to the determined level of negligence.*

Expiration of ammunition

Each piece of ammunition is marked with the year of manufacture and going by the general rule of the lifespan of ammunition, the expiry date can be easily calculated. While officers were generally aware of the recommended expectancy of 10 to 15 years, one station reported that only NPS headquarters is aware of actual expiration dates of issued ammunition. In other stations, it was said this information was available on the stored ammunition boxes, but this was not the case for multiple stations visited.

In one station, it was indicated that there is some ammunition in the armoury that was over 30 years old, a remarkable amount of time given the recommended 10-15 years before it should be disposed of. With ammunition over 10 years old in several stations, it was assumed by several officers that colleagues were on patrol with expired bullets.

One officer described that the SCPC has authority to dispose of ammunition in any manner they see fit and in line with the provisions of the SSOs, and this may include to use the ammunition in training exercises. However, Covid-19 related challenges have limited the number of trainings officers receive, preventing timely usage of older ammunition stocks. This is something stations need to pay attention to, should these activities be further restricted (see 'Disposal' section below). Of particular note, several respondents indicated that they cannot recall the last time there was a shooting exercise or refresher course. This means some officers carry firearms but there is no guarantee on their competency to use it; some were said to have last fired a weapon when in college. There is need for consistency and regularity of the shooting exercise.

The ammunition, as per standard international norms, should be kept separate from firearms. Officers were well aware of the hazards of storing arms on top of ammunition, or vice versa, pointing out that in emergency situations this can be dangerous should one step on ammunition or otherwise disturb it while trying to access other equipment, thus potentially rendering it useless.

> *To unlock this door, there is only one key, kept with the officer in charge of the armoury at all times. The rationale for this was to eliminate the risk of losing a second key.*

Lost or Expended ammunition

All officers reported they were well acquainted with the procedures to follow should ammunition go missing or be expended in normal line of police work, with descriptions of these processes following the SSOs.

One challenge with managing ammunition was noted to include accidental discharge of live bullets from weapons without being aware. This is a challenging circumstance to address as it is not a deliberate loss of a bullet, but a lost bullet, nonetheless. However, there are established procedures for dealing with an accidental discharge for the purpose of accounting for the lost ammunition. Such an event is recorded in the OB and reported to the OCS for further follow-up. The OCS may initiate an investigation if deemed necessary for any event in which ammunition (or a firearm, in all cases) has gone missing.[18] Collecting spent cartridges was noted as not always possible during live engagements during patrols but done so regularly during training exercises and competition shootings.[19]

Stations reported following standard procedure to account for expended ammunition,[20] and as necessary, forwarded an S12 request for new supply of ammunition when needed.

Stockpile security and maintenance

Lock and key and other physical security measures

All stations reported having two keys to access armouries, one kept with the OCS, the other with the officer in charge of the armoury. There was one exception to this. A second door within the interior of the Garissa armoury had only one key. The first room upon entry in the Garissa armoury contains record books, the disposition board, a desk, and other incidental non-firearm or ammunition materials. The second, interior door, opens up to the weapons-store section of the armoury. To unlock this door, there is only one key, kept with the officer in charge of the armoury at all times. The rationale for this was to eliminate the risk of losing a second key.

Secure storage of firearms in most station armouries included long metal bars to lock firearms into place on racks. Kasarani and Bungoma south uses chains for this purpose. Several stations were not equipped with this feature, however, and in one instance, firearms were simply stored upright inside of repurposed wooden bookshelves.

Noted in another station, the DCI keeps its own weapons and an armoury box within the station's main armory. The DCI thus is in possession of its own key to access this box; it also maintains its own records of movement and transfer of firearms and ammunition stored under its watch. The station armourer, in all cases, is not responsible for DCI records or firearms; the same is true for other law enforcement units (e.g., Tourist Police).

[18] See Chapter 14, "Arms and Ammunition", paragraph 19 of the NPS Standing Orders
[19] See Chapter 14, "Arms and Ammunition", paragraph 26 of the NPS Standing Orders
[20] See Chapter 14, "Arms and Ammunition", paragraph 25 of the NPS Standing Orders

Arms and Ammunition in transit

It was reported that escorts to transport firearms and ammunition shall include an officer of or above the rank of inspectorate, and armed police officers. As described by one officer, the size of the escort will depend on the number of arms being transported; a count of 100 to 120 firearms, as per an example given, will require two vehicles: one carrying the arms and ammunitions (with typically four armed officers) and the other vehicle carrying additional armed officers. A smaller escort (e.g., a single land cruiser) suffices for instances when only five to 10 arms are being transported. One officer noted that a security-escort vehicle should be equipped with a siren and prepared to avoid unnecessary stops when in route back to its destination.

Officers confirmed that all arms and ammunition must be transported in locked metal boxes, and there were no reported incidents of transported weapons and ammunition falling under any threat of diversion. One noted consideration, however, was the lack of police vehicles among stations to facilitate weapons transfers back to those stations. Bungoma south is in possession of one vehicle and is challenged when arms and ammunition have to be retrieved whilst the vehicle is performing daily police work.

Loss of Arms and Ammunition

Stations reported that if orwhen a firearm or ammunition is lost, either by theft or negligence, the incident is immediately registered into the OB, with record taken of the firearm type and serial number, time lost, involved officer's name, and description of details surrounding the case. One station, reported that the OCS notifies the SCPC in these situations, who in turn sends a signal to the DIG and chief armourer, as well as the director of the CID. At this point a file is opened for an investigation to establish if there was negligence and who is responsible. It was reported that the SCPC may conduct the investigation himself or appoint another qualified investigator to do so; the DCI may be involved if the situation warrants such involvement. It was mentioned that the investigator is often someone from outside the station to enable an impartial investigation.

If negligence is found to be the cause of the loss, the responsible officer could stand to be taken

If negligence is found to be the cause of the loss, the responsible officer could stand to be taken to court or dealt with administratively, and possibly fined according to the determined level of negligence.

to court or dealt with administratively, and possibly fined according to the determined level of negligence. The officer will also be surcharged the cost of the firearm(s) and/or ammunition lost. In cases where arms or ammunition have disappeared from the armoury, it will be the officer in charge of the armoury who will bear all responsibility if they cannot produce evidence within the inventory management records that the lost firearms or ammunition were otherwise accounted for properly.

Maintenance

The routine of maintaining firearms is generally the same among all the stations visited. As general practice, firearms in regular use are cleaned each day, typically when the firearms are returned to the armoury at the close of officers' shifts. For firearms not in regular use, they are cleaned and oiled once per week. Each station has its own schedule of when this happens, with either all firearms cleaned on the same day, or for those



armouries with larger quantities of firearms, done incrementally throughout the week. Some stations have designated cleaning teams that will collectively clean all firearms in the station in accordance to their own scheduling. Likewise, magazines are also cleaned on a weekly basis, with ammunition removed and springs examined. Some stations reported that magazines are rotated on a regular basis to regulate stress to magazine springs. Harmonisation of the maintenance process across stations will be ideal.

Several stations reported that the serviceability of weapons is checked each time a firearm is issued, checking trigger action, magazine fit, and review of the weapon generally to catch any obvious issue to address before signing it out.

Some stations emphasised the importance of impressing upon officers that it is their responsibility to ensure each day that their service weapon is operational. Stations typically have cleaning kits available for use by officers when returning their arms after duty.

In the case of the Central Arms Stores when new weapons are procured, a technical inspection is performed of all firearms prior to being recorded into the armoury's master ledger. Further, the technician will test and document that the firearms received are serviceable and fit for usage.

Repairs

It was noted by many officers that firearm-servicing is largely insufficient. While Armourer Circuit Units are located in each region of the country, these units face capacity challenges that preclude their ability to satisfy the degree of existing demand for firearms repair work. Armourer Circuit Units are based in Embu, Isiolo, Kakamega, Kisumu, Lodwar, Marsabit, Mombasa, Nakuru, and Nyeri. Armourer Circuit Units consist of trained arms-repair technicians. From their respective areas, they operate under the Chief Service Armourer based in the Service Headquarters in Nairobi.

It was pointed out by officers for this study that regional repair and servicing facilities need to be upgraded to modern equipment used within workshops, in addition to training more officers to serve as repair technicians. Stations can also be furnished with 'mini' workshops for the armorers.

For repairs, station officers in charge of the armory set aside firearms that are identified as inoperable. Firearms designated as such may be sent to the main armourer for repair and assessment, or someone from the Armourer Circuit Unit may visit to assess firearms, including operable firearms not necessarily identified as having technical problems. When firearms are sent out of the station for assessment and repair, a request is made from the armourer to the OCS, forwarded to the SCPC, and arrangements made to transport the firearms to the main armory for assessment, repair or replacement. This is done with an S12 form to facilitate the request for repair and assessment. Officers noted firearms out for repair are recorded on the GP 87 and condemned.

An NPS arms' repair workshop

Several officers overseeing armouries can attend to basic repair needs, (e.g., fixing screws, blockages, loose parts and sights), but they are limited and lack authority to undertake substantive repair work. However, it was said on a few occasions that if more officers were training formally to enhance technical-repair skills, this could alleviate delays and free up time of the Armourer Circuit Units, enabling them to more efficiently tend to large arms-repair demands; stations reported that delays to repairs can 'go on for months'.

The Armourer Circuit Unit caseload that the above officer is referring to includes frequent audits of multiple stations' arms, done at least once per annum for every station within each Armourer Circuit Unit's area of coverage. This, as one technician described, can prove quite burdensome.[21] In some cases, there are few unites relative to the area of coverage they are expected to serve. The services rendered by these technicians is something all officers interviewed for this study commented on, saying repeatedly that the units' services were vital, providing credence to the idea that additional technicians would well serve all stations in Kenya.

A technician in Nakuru provided a detailed overview of how the Armourers Circuit Unit operates within Nakuru, performing inspections of weapons at all police stations in the

[21] In 2020, 52 new police stations were gazetted in Nakuru, and over 1,150 in all of Kenya.

county for the NPS, as well as Prisons, KWS and the Forest Service present within the county. He also responds to special assignments outside of Nakuru or for other agencies, such as the GSU, with authorisation to do so from the Chief Service Armourer.

There are 30 stations in Nakuru county, and he makes an annual visit to each one of them – a schedule that he describes as challenging for one person to undertake, but nonetheless makes the effort to visit each annually or when requested with urgent demand for repairs and stock assessment. When he visits a station, he will make quick repairs (dependent on available spare parts) on site, and for firearms needing more technical repair work, assist the concerned station to facilitate repairs to be done in the workshop in Nakuru.

P80A form (Armorer's Inspection Report form)

For each station visited, the armourer provides that station with a P80A 'Inspection Report' form. On the P80A, the armourer describes the general condition of a firearm and the repairs needed. Upon the armourer's return to Nakuru, the information of the P80A is entered into a computer-formatted document (an "e-P80A", as it were) and emailed to the concerned station for its records; this form is later used by the concerning station to authorize the transfer of firearms to the Nakuru workshop (the form is sent to the SCPC and other relevant action as stipulated in the NPS Standing Orders).[22] While an electronic P80A form is produced by the armourer, there is no computerised database of P80A forms. Establishing a digitised method to maintain these records will streamline P80A record-keeping and enable quick referencing of repairs firearms among all Armourer Circuit Units and the Central Armoury.

With its copy of the P80A, the concerned station will forward a letter back to Nakuru, confirming serial numbers of firearms to be delivered for repair and description of problems as indicated in the P80A form. The concerned station will then organise an escort for the firearms to be transported. When the firearms are delivered to the Nakuru armorer, a receipt is provided to the delivering officer, stating the date, name of delivering officer, and equipment delivered. In lieu of an official receipt – as one does not exist, the armourer in Nakuru has designed his own receipt-template (detailed below) to ensure optimal accounting of the P80A / repair process.

The P80A form used by the armourer is the standard NPS form used for this purpose. Once the concerned station's firearms are received by the armourer, he will proceed with the repairs if the necessary parts are on-hand and is able to perform the repairs indicated as needed in the original P80A. In some instances, repair work may be delayed as spares must be requested and received from Nairobi, a process initiated through an S12 request (see the above section, "Procurement", for additional details concerning the S12). Once repairs are completed, communication is sent back to the concerned station via email. When that station comes to collect the repaired firearms, the officer authorised to pick the

[22] See Chapter 65, "Service Armourers Branch", paragraph 10 of the NPS Standing Orders.

Provincial Workshop Book

All firearms entering the Nakuru workshop for repair are entered into the Provincial Workshop Record Book (PWBR). This record book contains all firearms repairs undertaken at the Nakuru workshop dating back to 2008. It is the only record book used by the armorer in Nakuru to track all past and active firearms-repair activity. The spares used are recorded into the PWBR and noted for the next order to replenish the parts used.

BOX 2: Armourer Circuit Unit (Rift Valley Region Case study) – Workshop receipts

When firearms are delivered for repair to the Nakuru armourer, the armourer provides a printed workshop receipt with a description of the firearms delivered, date and signature of delivering officer, and armorer confirming delivery.

The workshop receipt used in this case was designed by the armourer himself in an effort to fill a documentation gap in the handling of the weapons-for-repair process. With his office computer, he prints a receipt for firearms received for repair. He assigns a reference number and prepares two copies – one for his records and another for the concerned station. When an officer returns to pick-up the repaired firearms, the receipt is signed again by the picking officer and the armorer, confirming the repairs rendered and the transfer of the repaired equipment; the original is given to the collecting officer and a duplicate remaining with the armourer.

The armourer reported that the workshop receipt was necessary as the P80A form does not serve the purpose of verifying the actual transfer of repaired weapons. The P80A is only an inspection report, and the P80A does not allow for signatures to verify delivery/pick-up. With a workshop receipt, the delivering officer has proof of what was delivered and what was later received post-repair. The receipt also provides the armorer with the same verification.

Marking

There are instances when unmarked firearms enter into the hold of the armoury. Such weapons have included firearms from areas where not all NPS arms have been formally marked,[23] including Mandera. These weapons may come into other stations armouries due to repair or status-assessment requests. In such instances, the serial numbers of the firearms are recorded into the appropriate register.

Coastal stations have a unique challenge with markings, not evident among stations elsewhere in the country. In particular, G3s appear to be the most susceptible to

[23] In this context, besides the mandatory factory marking, the National Police Service have put on extra unique marks on each firearm: Five pointed star denoting RECSA unique identifier …*, Country Code for Kenya …KE and End User Identification ..KP…… (for Kenya Police Service), AP …(for Administration Police Service), KPS…. (for Kenya Prisons), KWS….(for Kenya Wildlife Service) and KFS ….(for Kenya Forest Service)

rusting within the humid coastal climate; AK types were also seen to be susceptible to rust damage. Several G3sno longer had visible markings due to excessive rusting and cleaning, most often where markings were located on the G3 receivers. In one instance, it was noted that a former officer in charge of armoury had applied his own markings to guns for his internal record-keeping.. The extent to which these improvised markings were relayed to other stations to update GP 87s is not known.

In any instance that a firearm has a similar service number to another firearm, an alternative service number may be issued e.g. '123A' and '123B', where '123' is the common number; this is done at the Chief Service Armourer. This is to be indicated on all other arms registers and registry records that contain the firearm in question. It is unknown if this type of scenario may factor into arms manually marked, as described above.

Picture of a marked firearm belonging to Kenya Wildlife Service

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Magazines

When asked if magazines were marked, no station responded in the affirmative. This was mentioned as a concern at two stations, noting that a functioning magazine could be swapped with a dysfunctional one outside of the station and brought back to the station and deposited; there is no way to verify that the magazines checked-out are the same returned.

Inspections and checks

All stations report an established routine for physical inspections of armouries and review of inventory record-keeping. They are conducted quarterly with more detailed inspections occurring on an annual basis. However, it was also stated that not all stations are inspected to the extent that they should be, in full, on an annual inspection. One officer noted that there is a general problem in many stations and posts of poor documentation and record keeping, raising the issue of the importance of regular inspections of records for all stations, quarterly, annually, and follow-up where issues with inventory management are identified.

Quarterly and annual inspections

Quarterly inspections are said to typically include examination of armoury cleanliness, firearms inventory (type and quantity), and records books and registries, including GP 87 and arms movement records. The SCPC typically performs these inspections or may appoint a deputy. When completed, the SCPC forwards a report with recommendations to the OCS, who in turn shares it with the officer in charge of the armoury. Issues are addressed at this stage including incomplete records, untidy spaces, illegible markings on firearms, etc. This examination of the armoury requires a check of every gun, pistol, etc, one by one, as one officer put it. Records with missing data are returned for updates with details of what is missing to ensure that physical accountability is undertaken. Quarterly inspection reports are to be forwarded to headquarters in Nairobi.

Quarterly inspections are said to typically include examination of armoury cleanliness, firearms inventory (type and quantity), and records books and registries, including GP 87 and arms movement records.

Annual inspections are reported to take place at all stations visited. These include a full armoury inspection, conducted by the SCPC. There are some limitations to the frequency of

these inspections, however, and there exist logistical challenges for SCPCs to conduct these inspections at all stations for which they are responsible. SCPC inspection reports are forwarded to NPS headquarters.

For some armouries, inventory inspections can be quite intensive due to the scope of the inspection needed. In one station, it takes roughly four days to hand-count the number of ammunition one by one. This is followed by proper documentation by verifying with the arms register and the returns posted to headquarters. The whole process of inventory inspections can be digitised.

Spot checks

Spot checks are impromptu inspections which are not formerly scheduled and do not include a full inspection of all registers or weapons. While these checks are required to take place, they usually are limited to checking a few weapons or single pages within a register. They are meant to check whether there are potential risks, and also as a way of ensuring station operations run smoothly as required but are limited by budget constraints for headquarter teams to undertake these inspections in a regular manner. The spot checks should be regularised to all stations.

Disposal

There was some discrepancy between stations regarding the process to undertake disposal of condemned firearms and ammunition. One station reported that it was possible for rural stations to dispose of ammunition locally, given that certain measures were taken (e.g., authorised witness present for the disposal, and done so in accordance with standard disposal procedure). However, in another station it was stated that it was not possible for rural stations to dispose of expired ammunition at all (or firearms), and that all materials for disposal must be transported to Nairobi headquarters, as per regulation.

In any case, what was commonly said among all station informants, is that a P81 Condemnation Certificate is required to authorise the transport of material for disposal. Weapons condemned at the respective service central arms workshops as beyond economical repair are supposed to be returned to the Service Central Arms Stores to be retained for subsequent Board of Survey action. In this same vein, the P81 is required to be completed before any request can be made for replacements (S12 form) of any condemned (or expired) firearms. It is often someone from the Armourer Circuit Unit that must endorse a P81, marking “BLR” (beyond local repair) on the certificate. Condemnation certificates accompany each firearm once ready for transfer. It was also mentioned that the original P81 will remain with the Armourer Circuit Unit while a duplicate goes out to the station from which the condemned firearm(s) was received. The concerned station then maintains that duplicate copy until replacements are available, then use that duplicate P81 to claim the replacement upon delivery or pick-up.

Training

All stations noted that the Covid-19 pandemic has had detrimental impacts on training, but even before the pandemic, training had been infrequent. Since early 2020, normal training exercises have not been taking place, notably shooting training and shooting competitions. This has had several impacts:

- Officers are not getting regular shooting-range practice, affecting their skills and development, and restricting familiarity with newer weapons types.
- As ammunition is not being used as frequently (because of the drop in trainings), stations are not able to use-up expired and older ammunition in their stores in a timely manner.
- Officers report that refresher training courses are also not taking place, including basic training exercises, promotional courses and annual classification.

One location that appears to be less affected by the pandemic is in Laikipia, where police operating in the parks are able to conduct some training exercises, presumably because of fewer restrictions on movement (e.g., working within a more "open" space) as compared to other parts of the country.

Stations indicated that shooting competitions are not taking place during this time. It is evident that competitions are highly valued activities, and all officers are looking forward to their return.

Destruction of illicit and obsolete arms by the NPS

Apart from pandemic-related challenges impeding trainings, there were also a number of training needs identified that stations would like to see more of. One is the area of basic weapons repair and more advance weapons repair training. One officer managing an armoury in the Coast region reported that he has basic repair skills, but with more advanced training, this could expedite the repair of those firearms in need of immediate attention in order for stations to maintain in optimal strength, and particularly so when the Chief Service Armourer or Armourer Circuit Unit is occupied with other repair work and unable to attend promptly to individual stations' needs.

In one station, the officer in charge of the armoury found it necessary to train some of the officers on how to properly clean firearms and enhance their general operational knowledge on how to use them. It is presumed that during the pandemic period, and with refresher courses not taking place as they usually do, this kind of ad hoc training is happening more frequently.

In other cases, officers expressed concern that some of their colleagues were under-trained for the positions they held at the station. For instance, there are occasions when a ranking officer, such as a sergeant, did not have knowledge on how to properly handle all firearms types on store at a station, and in one case, this prevented him from performing his responsibilities as a sergeant.

Elsewhere, an OCS noted that they did not receive formal training for these positions before assuming these roles, but instead underwent a 'hands-on' learning phase following their appointment. Another officer in charge of an armoury noted that he received no training at all on how to manage an armoury, nor was there a proper hand-over when he first started in this role. He learned as he went and formed his own routine with record keeping and so on, as best he could. This experience was similar to another in a different station; the previous armourer was not present for his transition to help him fully understand the armoury's inventory, location of equipment within it, or any challenges and concerns with existing equipment, as well as proper management of deposited firearms and other equipment under temporary hold for officers away from duty. It is not known how often such situations arise, but it was heard frequently enough during the course of this study to be a potentially worrisome occurrence.

Concerning newer weapons types, one officer in charge of an armoury mentioned that there is need for training officers how to safely handle new types of firearms. Officers can benefit from training on how to store new weapons, remove magazines, remove chambered bullets and general PSSM training (no specific details given to this last point). He noted officers needed training on new weapon types including; Beretta rifles, Galil Ace 52s, CZ 807s and Gilboa M43s. He noted that the Administration Police are trained with these weapons, but officers from the NPS were not trained on the firearm types.

One particular challenge noted with regard to digitised record keeping is that many officers simply do not have the requisite computer literacy skills needed to manage this.

Expanding the use of digitised record keeping in stations will require capacity-needs assessments and proper planning of computer literacy and basic skills-training to enable such systems to be effective.

One anecdote of mention concerns the armourer in Nakuru, discussed above. In order to do his work more effectively, and in particular work with a computer to input data and print forms, he paid for his own computer training at a local college. He said that such training was not offered otherwise, so he took it upon himself to gain the necessary skills required to better perform his work. Such anecdotes are testament to the dedication that some officers have in taking the initiative to enhance their skills for the betterment of the NPS.

Control of civilian arms

All stations reported having a civilian firearms register, and in nearly all cases stations had civilian weapons and ammunition currently stored in their armouries. Processes of accepting and reviewing civilian application for firearms licenses also seemed well established and in-line with proper procedures.

Civilian arms register

Stations report using Form 18 to record the receipt of and facilitate storage of civilian firearms into police station custody. A duplicate copy is provided to the person depositing the firearm to later use to collect the firearm(s) deposited. The information from Form 18 is then entered into a civilian firearms registry. There were no reported revocations of civilians wishing to deposit a firearm.

However, in some cases civilians had deposited their guns due to the expiration of their firearms licenses, and in these cases, the guns had been in the armoury for periods exceeding the stipulated 1-month period. In fact, in several stations, civilian firearms had been in store for 12 months or more. In one station, the officer interviewed was of the understanding that civilian arms could be kept without removal for three months, while another claimed that the time it could be stored in the station was indefinite. Other stations appeared to enforce this regulation with more attention, mentioning that after a one-month period firearms were sent to the licensing board if not collected after attempts to contact the owner; but this latter situation was in the minority.

> *In the case of the expired licenses, it was assumed that the owners would eventually come to reclaim them once the licenses were renewed.*

In the case of the expired licenses, it was assumed that the owners would eventually come to reclaim them once the licenses were renewed. With Form 18, stations do have contact information of the owners, but regular follow-up did not seem a priority, or happen frequently, to make determinations of when this might happen, or to stress the one (1)-month limit to storing these firearms. Stations reported that the quantities of civilian firearms in storage were quite few, meaning the space they were occupying was relatively small; perhaps this explains the lack of urgency in moving civilian firearms out of the station when past the one-month period. Civilian firearms were kept in locked metal boxes in most cases, however, there were civilian guns observed that were not kept in boxes but set somewhere in the open of the armoury.

In one instance where four civilian firearms were held in the armoury, one of them had been in storage for over 12 months. The owner was determined to be mentally unwell and hence, unable to reclaim the handgun. Contact has been made with a relative, but no actions had been taken to reclaim the gun. Due to the nature of this situation, where the owner remains in legal ownership of the firearm, it is assumed by the OCS that the owner will need to demonstrate mental wellness to reclaim the gun; it cannot be released to a person other than the owner.

All stations reported that the owner must deposit and claim firearms with an original gun license. In some cases, civilians have brought their firearms to the station to oil and clean them.

Civilian firearms applications

Stations described the application process in generally the same manner, basically entailing the first step as the application process done at the station, then from the OCS' desk, applications are either denied or initially 'approved' and forwarded to the County Security and Intelligence Committee for review. Requirements were said to also include a psychological test, home visit (to confirm residence and safe storage capacity), good conduct report, employment history, bank information, and a good reason to justify the application and possession. It was stated that the OCS must visit the home of the applicant to ensure that a safe is present – located in the ground or in a wall, not a free standing/sitting safe. Importantly, the station which initially received a civilian license application is the only station authorized to issue the license once approved.



However, as described in one station, the process has not been dully followed, and firearms have been issued to people, including politicians, within a very short time and without completing the entire application process. It is important, one officer added, that applicants are conversant with the weapon they have, otherwise they will endanger themselves and others. Civilians must have some training on the firearms and how to handle firearms and it should be issued to someone who is sober and of sound mind. Persons who are temperamental should not be issued with a firearm. There was also concern of whether all civilian firearms are marked. A prerequisite to qualify for – or renew - a civilian license should be that any licensed firearms bear clear markings to enable traceability and establish ownership.

It was also reported that one OCS had facilitated processes involving issuance of temporary possession permits. For one station, 30 such permits had been issued. These are used to facilitate arming of security teams at conservancies, especially those without National Police Reserve status. This is the case for Ol Pejeta Conservancy.

Overall challenges

- It was generally recognised that a digitised weapons-management system would enhance the tracing of firearms across stations and counties. However, for this system to be more useful and complementary, other branches in police stations like the crime branch will need to be digitised as well.

- Firearms are issued in accordance with the need of the patrolling officer. Riots may require rubber bullets, while pistols will be issued for undercover activity. However, some stations have many 1960s-70s issued firearms and these firearms are problematic. They require a greater degree of maintenance due to their age and several of them have been rendered inoperable because of age and unreliability operationally.

- There are too many police posts and stations not sufficiently equipped with secure armories. Where structures do exist, they are reported by the OCS as “fine”, but there are newer stations and posts (since 1946 when most armories were built) that don’t have secure armories or other storage facilities. For other armories, including the Nakuru armoury, the space of the armory is too small, making armories congested and access to all materials and equipment stored within them become cumbersome.

- In more rural areas, digitising records will not be possible as long as there are power issues. Management of arms at these places will remain dependent on manual record keeping and management.

Conclusion

There is a general compliance among stations with SSOs, but there are also many challenges. Manual record keeping can be upgraded to electronic applications alongside the electronic OB rollout. This will require an investment in capacity building for officers who lack requisite computer literacy skills. With younger and tech savvy officers joining the service, the institution appears ready for this transition.

Older police stations are in dire need for armoury upgrades to offer adequate space for increased stockpiles and enable compliance with SSOs on storage arrangements. Alternative storage is needed for sensitive materials like court exhibits to decongest armouries. Sufficient counter and desk-top space will enable armourers to meet the needed checks during issuance and collection of arms on return. The first-in first-out principle in ammunition management will then be achieved with ease of movement and organization within adequate storage spaces.

Casual practices such as 'blind' counting of ammunition in magazines should be avoided. Naturally, there is risk involved in only pressing the top bullet of a magazine to check that it is full. Should a spent cartridge, for example, be used to replace a live bullet at the bottom of the magazine, this could go undetected. As such, there is need to harmonise ammunition-check methods across all stations. Further, the practice of issuing ammunition can be digitised.

While armourers PSSM skills and knowledge can be upscaled, regular firearm users need to sharpen their awareness to safely handle weapons. It was indicated by several respondents that some of the officers cannot recall the last time they fired their weapons. The ideal scenario would be where each officer has a weapon set to their personalised requirements.

Where stockpile security is guaranteed, the diversion of state stocks to illicit markets is eliminated thereby increasing the safety of police officers since criminals will be starved of supplies. Further, risks like fire and physical damage of arms and ammunition are also reduced.

Recommendations

- An assessment of all NPS armouries should be conducted to identify priority stations in need of refurbishment and/or (re)construction of armouries. An assessment will inform the development of a strategic plan to improve existing storage infrastructure, with armouries prioritised on a scoring matrix including: overall risk to arms diversion, theft, and loss; risk of accidental damage or degradation of material putting officers' safety at risk.

- To address substandard armoury structures, the NPS should enhance its oversight mechanism to ensure all new police stations and armouries, especially those sponsored under public-private partnerships, meet minimum requirements with regard to size, floor plans, materials used, and other security and safety features (e.g., doors, rifle racks, etc).

- Ensure the resumption of normal firearms-handling training, including shooting competitions to ensure competency in the use and handling of firearms. From a relatively small sample size (only 12 stations visited), a majority identified the lack of training as a principal risk to officer safety. In addition, the lack of regular shooting training and exercises is rendering older ammunition hazardous as it remains in armouries and, hence, in police circulation.

- Urgently provide armouries to police stations that lack them while addressing those with old, dilapidated structures for armouries.

- Enhanced inspections: Perform regular impromptu checks on armouries to ensure compliance. These monitoring snap-inspections and audit checks should be by senior officers at headquarters.

- Upgrading repair and maintenance facilities: Regional repair and servicing facilities need to be upgraded to modernise standards and improve equipment within workshops, in addition to training more officers to serve as repair technicians.

- Marking for magazines should be introduced to ensure they cannot be exchanged for weak or illicit ones.

- Establishment of an Electronic Record Management System (ERMS) that is more secure, tamper proof, and with a back-up in case of loss. This should be integrated and robust enough to manage all procedures in arms management including, issuance, storage, movement, inspection and perioding accounting from the national to police station levels. While an electronic P80A form is produced by the armourer, there is no computerised database of P80A forms. Establishing a digitised method to maintain these records will streamline P80A record-keeping and enable quick referencing of firearms repairs among all Armourer Circuit Units and the Central Armoury.

- Strengthening the capacities of the departments responsible for arms management within the NPS, and other security agencies. This is important as it can play an important role of ensuring that the detailed procedures are implemented. For example, the armourer circuit units should be well resourced to carry out their field inspection duties and make them more accountable to ensure that there are no violations of firearm protocals and procedures.

- With regard to civilian firearms management, more attention should be paid in safeguarding the criteria for need and suitability assessment to ensure that only those meeting the strict criteria are allowed to possess arms only when they need them. However, "temporary permits to possess" arms should be discouraged as they present the greatest risk to misuse of firearms by civilians.

- Develop strict guidelines for civilian use of firearms is critical to ensure that civilian holders are more responsible, accountable and know the consequences of misuse of firearms.

- To enhance accountability, all civilian firearms should be marked. This will enable receiving stations determine easily when presented with an illegal firearm.

ARMS AND AMMUNITION:
Control and Inventory Management Procedures for Kenya Police Service

Kenya Police Headquarters,
Vigilance House, Harambee Avenue,
PO BOX 30083, Nairobi, Kenya.
Telephone: (020) 341411/6/8
www.kenyapolice.go.ke

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