




REINVENT Baseline Report

January 2020

FIGURE 1: MAP OF KENYA SHOWING THE RE-INVENT PROGRAMME¹ OPERATIONAL AREAS (COUNTIES)




¹ Reducing Insecurity and Violent Extremism in the Northern and Coastal regions of Kenya (RE-INVENT) is a £20m 5-year programme that aims to enhance Kenyan capacity and capability to address inter-communal conflict, weak community-police relations, violence against women and girls (VAWG), violent extremism and election related violence. The Programme supports the continued advancement of police reforms to improve the management, oversight and accountability of the police force building on the experience of the Kenya Improving Community Security Programme (ICS- Jamii Thabiti Programme) (2014-19). The Impact of the programme is "Improved community safety and security as measured by effect on inclusive and equitable development, investment and service delivery in Kenya." The Outcome is "Improved state and non-state actors' collaboration in a mutually accountable and inclusive manner to respond effectively to root causes of violence".

ACRONYMS

ACSC	Anti-Corruption Steering Committee	IPOA	Independent Police Oversight Authority
ADR	Alternative Dispute Resolution	JT	Jamii Thabiti
AG	Attorney General	KDF	Kenya Defence Forces
AP	Administration Police	KII	Key Informant Interview
ASTU	Anti-stock theft unit	KNCHR	Kenya National Commission on Human Rights
ASALs	Arid and Semi-Arid Lands	KWS	Kenya Wildlife Service
CAPs	Community Action Plans	LAPSSET	Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport
CAJ	Commission for the Administration of Justice	MCA	Member of County Assembly
CBO	Community Based Organisation	M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
CC	County Commissioner	MERL	Monitoring Evaluation Research and Learning
CDF	Constituency Development Fund	NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
CSD	Conflict Sensitive Development	NPS	National Police Service
CSOs	Civil Society Organisations	NPSC	National Police Service Commission
CVE	Countering Violent Extremism	NPR	National Police Reserve
DAI	Development Alternatives Inc.	NSAs	Non-State Actors
DCC	Deputy County Commissioner	OB	Occurrence Book
DCI	Directorate of Criminal Investigations	OCS	Officer Commanding Police Station
DDG	Danish Demining Group	OCPD	Officer Commanding Police Division
DDP	Deepening Democracy in Kenya	ODPP	Office of the Director for Public Prosecutions
DFID	Department for International Development	PWDs	Persons with Disabilities
DIG KPS	Deputy Inspector General Kenya Police Service	RDU	Rapid Deployment Unit
DRC	Danish Refugee Council	RE-INVENT	Reducing Insecurity and Violent Extremism in the Northern and Coastal Regions
DNH	Do No Harm	REA	Rural Electricity Authority
EACC	Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission	RPBS	RE-INVENT Programme Baseline Survey
ESIA	Environmental and Social Impact Assessments	RUSI	Royal United Services Institute
FGD	Focus Group Discussion	SGBV	Sexual Gender-Based Violence
FGM	Female Genital Mutilation	SMART	Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant and Timebound
FIDA-K	Federation of Kenya Women Lawyers	STTE	Short Term Technical Expert
GBV	Gender-Based Violence	SOPs	Standard Operating Procedures
GDC	Geothermal Development Company	SSOs	Service Standing Orders
GSU	General Service Unit	TJRC	Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, United Kingdom
GoK	Government of Kenya	UK	United Kingdom
IAU	Internal Affairs Unit	UN	United Nations
ICS	Kenya Improving Community Security Programme	UNHCR	United National High Commission for Refugees
ICT	Information and Communication Technology	UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
ICTJ	International Centre for Transitional Justice	VAWG	Violence against Women and Girls
IG	Inspector General of Police	VE	Violent Extremism



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY



2014 and 2018

The programme supported more than **400 000** individuals in four types of activities: clean cooking, forest management, renewable energy in agri-food chains, and policy support in **14 countries**.

- I. The REINVENT Programme commissioned a baseline survey in October 2019 to address three interlinked questions. What key performance indicators are emerging across the target 18 counties impacting the Programme outputs² Second, what unique and cross cutting trends are emerging across the programme workstreams and third, what implications/opportunities do the performance indicators and trends present to the implementation?
- II. The study utilized a mixed-methods research approach, through which data was collected from 3,886 households, 277 key informants, 54 FGDs, 57 police commanders, and 57 police stations across eighteen counties. Secondary data was obtained through a desk review of relevant documents, which included reports by government agencies, media, researchers and other actors involved in safety and security issues in the target counties and nationally.
- III. The findings indicate a marked contrast in the fluidity of perceptions and reality of security and safety. Across counties perceived to be insecure and with marked cases of violent extremism (VE)- Mandera, Wajir, Garissa, Tana River, Lamu, West Pokot, Turkana, Samburu, Baringo and Isiolo, the baseline reports a marked improvement of safety and security which challenges national perceptions on safety and security. Two explanations can be deduced from this finding. First, locals perceive safety as the absence of local residents among casualties/fatalities following insecurity incidences. As long as terror incidences/ cattle rustling attacks afflict nonlocals i.e. Government security agents, non-local teachers, Quarry workers and transport vehicles ferrying nonlocals, locals consider themselves safe. The second explanation could be the fact that the tendency for the State to adopt militarization and curfews as default responses to addressing insecurity creates a climate of fear that suppresses reporting and possibly drives petty criminals to other counties fearing the crackdown. Moreover, increasing militarization leads to extra judicial killings and retaliation to citizens who would potentially report on cases of crime perpetrated by security agencies. This could potentially lead to the self/community censorship around incidences and occurrences of insecurity.
- IV. Secondly, the veracity of data from police stations lacks uniform categorization of incidences of certain forms of violence (violence against women and girls; violent extremism; and election related violence). The incomplete data of reported, withdrawn and concluded cases at police stations and the lack of standardization in capturing crime calls for a better approach in arriving at the overall score of safety and security in the target counties.
- V. Third, drivers of violence are time sensitive and peak at certain seasons depending on the stress and resilience factors in the counties. There were relatively low reported incidences of election violence, violent extremism and cattle rustling (a sub-category of criminal violence) across all counties which could peak when there are incidences of drought or the election season approaches. Also, the escalation of insecurity is dependent on the nature of response by security and State agents in handling previous incidences of violence and the local capacities and interventions by State and Non state and dispute resolution actors.

² Expected Outputs:

Increased practice of accountability to build police (and other security agencies) effectiveness when addressing community security, violent extremism and election security.

Strengthened agency of women and girls in peace, safety and security.

Intra and inter institutional commitment to address the root causes and drivers of conflict.

Knowledge and evidence generated and utilised to enhance community and institutional learning and adaptation

What implications do these findings pose to the REINVENT Programming?

1. **Recast programming from a human security perspective:** To effectively measure impact on “Change in safety and security in Kenya” and “achieving an enabling investment environment in Kenya,” there is need to review sources of data and the possible inclusion of both process and change level sub-indicators. Bearing in mind the challenge with police station data verifiability, it is important that indicators for reviewing programme impact show the quantity or quality of desired change, the target of change, and an extrapolation of the timeframe when the change is expected bearing in mind some interventions might extend beyond the duration of the programme. Also, based on regional and intra-regional variations and dynamics, indicators around levels of violence, management of conflicts, and CSD may change especially in counties where stress and vulnerability factors are linked to climate change, contestation of power and unresolved historical grievances.
2. **Develop an innovative tracking approach towards measuring and communicating outcomes:** The complexity of the RE-INVENT Programme-multiple workstreams, activities, strategies, actors, and operational areas, requires innovative approaches of tracking impact and contribution attributable specifically to the REINVENT Programme and influencing efforts made by the REINVENT partnerships, collaborations to the whole sector. Results-based and Outcome Harvesting Approaches could be a possible approach to track and capture outcomes. The REINVENT Programme should therefore find a niche in packaging interventions as learning, influencing and advocacy products/forums to the benefit of the wider peace and security sector.
3. **Develop common criteria to assess police reforms:** To objectively track and demonstrate the change contributed by the RE-INVENT Programme in the priority police stations, there is need to develop a Police Stations Reforms Index that identifies priority reforms (core reform package) and implementation of the reforms across the various priority stations.
4. **Consider integrating Climate Change actions under the CSD and peacebuilding workstreams.** Measuring development and investment indicators and the correlation to climate induced conflict will enable the CSD workstream to identify policy, operational, management and capacity challenges that different actors encounter. Many of the reasons provided for the prevailing inter-communal conflicts in most of the target counties (notably those in North Eastern, Rift Valley and Upper Eastern regions) revolve around availability, access, and utilization of increasingly scarce resources (notably water, pasture, and markets).
5. **Adopt a power and system thinking approach:** The diversity and multi-faceted nature of proximate causes and effects of conflicts suggest that power and system thinking approaches³ will position REINVENT Programme interventions strategically to deliver expected outputs. This need is particularly evident given the issue of improved management of major conflicts associated with diverse and often inter-linked socioeconomic, political and structural factors in the target counties.



In humanitarian settings many displaced people – and often the nearby communities that host them – lack access to clean, safe and secure energy services.

³ This recommendation speaks directly to the questions about the root causes of social problems such as historical inter-communal conflicts prevailing in most of the target counties, how the social problems affect different social groups, and how best to change the situation. For further information on “power and system thinking approaches”, see Duncan Green (2016), “How Change Happens”, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

SCOPE AND DESIGN OF THE STUDY

It is becoming widely accepted that the provision of food aid without addressing recipients' access to a secure and efficient source of energy for cooking and lighting will rapidly result in increased levels of risk for displaced people, as well as leading to deforestation and desertification in the mid to long term

The purpose of the baseline study was to collect qualitative and quantitative data to show the current safety and security situation in the RE-INVENT Programme counties⁴. The specific objectives were to establish the baseline for the programme's performance indicators⁵ and to collect information relevant to the RE-INVENT Programme.

Household interviews were conducted electronically in *face to face encounters* with the household head (man or woman or a youth member). The interviews used a structured questionnaire with mostly closed-ended questions. *Key Informant Interviews* were held through face to face encounters using semi-structured interview schedules tailored to each key informant category.

Community-level FGDs were conducted using an FGD guide with open-ended questions and these were tape-recorded and transcribed for computer-aided analysis. *Non-participant observations* of physical and non-physical aspects relevant to the study were conducted in the Priority police stations using a structured observation checklist. The data collection tools were pretested, and adjustments made before the full data collection. Secondary data were obtained through a *desk review* of relevant literature, including RE-INVENT Programme documents, media reports, official crime records, and recent studies on safety and security matters. Annexure 7 provides a list of documents consulted.

The processing of study data commenced immediately after the completion of fieldwork and was carried by the consultants with the support of a team of transcribers and data analysts. The process involved editing the various data sets for completeness and the transcribing of the FGD audios. This was followed by the analysis of *quantitative data* (household data, police station crime data, and police station observations) using the statistical package for the social sciences (SPSS) and advanced Excel computer application programmes.

The focus of quantitative data analysis was the generation of *descriptive statistics* (frequencies, percentages, and averages) to aid the coherent presentation of the findings in the form of text, tables, charts, and graphs. Annexure 12 provides results of household data on key variables of the study. *Qualitative data* from KIIs and FGDs were transcribed, coded and analysed using the NVivo Version 12 computer software and followed a carefully prepared thematic analytical framework (Annexure 5). The results of the qualitative analysis have been presented in the report in the form of text, boxes, and direct quotes.

Ethical Considerations

The study was conducted in strict adherence to ethical norms and standards for research involving human subjects. Key ethical issues were discussed during one-day methodology training for the baseline survey team in Nairobi. These included informed consent, respect for the views of the study participants, the confidentiality of data, anonymity in reporting, do-no-harm principle, and the need for the research team to desist from acts of commission or omission that could cause harm to respondents, local communities, and the reputation of the RE-INVENT Programme and its implementing partners. The study data were solicited from consenting adults, securely stored, and were accessible to only authorised personnel during the analysis and report writing phase.


⁴ The obtained data aimed to provide a complete picture of the situation on each performance indicator before the full roll-out of the RE-INVENT Programme activities across all the six workstreams. These baseline values would then be used to assess and compare the progress made by the programme periodically, and at midline and end line.

⁵ These are contained in the RE-INVENT Programme Log frame (Annexure 1). There are 14 indicators (2 impact level indicators, 2 outcome level indicators, and 10 output indicators) of which the majority are quantitative indicators. Each of these indicators has 2-3 sub-indicators to enhance clarity and ease of measurement.

Challenges and Limitations of the Study

- a) Violence data at many of the priority police stations was either not easily accessible missing/ barred access to Occurrence Book during the visit to the stations), inadequate (missing crucial details such as the age and gender of the perpetrators or victims of violence), poorly organised and without basic analysis (monthly, quarterly and annual summaries of cases by type). Where observed data gaps could not be addressed sufficiently, additional details were sought from the National Police Service database in Nairobi.
- b) Priority police stations capture violence data in ways that revealed significant overlaps and confusion. For example, under the criminal violence, the records contained several confusing sub-categories: offensive conduct; “robbery” vs robbery with violence; stealing vs stealing of farm produce and theft of stock; and possession of narcotic drugs vs possession of drugs and/or illicit brew vs drug trafficking/ smuggling. Also, several sub-categories of violence (creating disturbance, malicious damage to property, rape, murder, and fighting over land demarcation) are recorded under two or more forms of violence (violence against women and girls, criminal violence, inter-communal violence, election violence, and violent extremism). To deal with these challenges, members of the research team spent considerably more time in the collection and analysis of the police stations’ violence data.
- c) Due to insecurity, fieldwork was suspended for one week in Marsabit County. Inter-tribal conflict arose on 6th November 2019 in Marsabit Central sub-county between Gabra and Borana communities, which led to the death of over 10 people. The skirmishes occurred in areas where fieldwork was underway. While county targets for the county was met to a very large extent, the disruption hindered data collection at North Horr Police Station. Instead, violence data on this police station were obtained from the national NPS database in Nairobi⁶.

The above limitations relate to the following four issues:



a) Comparability: The field research concentrated on the eighteen counties, specifically the catchment areas of the sub counties including Priority Police Stations. This was informed by the fact that policing is a central workstream in the programme implementation and hence many of the activities are planned within police stations and their surroundings. Perhaps the inclusion of control groups would have yielded additional data for comparative purposes⁷. Such data is also useful for assessing the extent of counterfactual within the RE-INVENT operational areas⁸ at the end of the implementation of the programme in 2024.



b) Generalisability: Data collected from the eighteen counties on the impact level indicators (Change in safety and security in Kenya on violence and enabling investment environment in Kenya on ease of doing business) may not be extrapolated to the national level. This is because the target counties are not a representative sample; they have certain characteristics (relatively higher levels of insecurity, poverty, and underdevelopment, as well as pastoralist production system) that set them apart from the rest of the country.



c) Context: The timing of the survey and the context of the target counties may have influenced baseline values for some of the variables. This is especially concerning violence data reported at the priority police stations, and community perceptions of violence (especially violent extremism, election violence, and inter-communal violence) and CSD issues. For example, there were relatively low reported incidences of election violence, violent extremism and cattle rustling (a sub-category of criminal violence)



- d) called “low season” for these forms of crime. Also, specific events in the study counties during the fieldwork period might have affected responses on some of the study variables, notably the prevalence and incidences of violence, professionalism and effectiveness of the security agents in the handling of violence, and management of conflict. For example, the inter-tribal conflict that erupted in Marsabit Central Sub-county of Marsabit County in the first week of November 2019 in areas where fieldwork was underway might have influenced the responses on some of the study variables.
- e) **Data adequacy:** Findings on the prevalence and incidence of violence in the target counties are based largely on data collected from the priority police stations. The police station violence data do not give a complete picture due to the observed underreporting of incidences of certain forms of violence (violence against women and girls; violent extremism; and election violence), incomplete follow up on reported cases at police stations, and data management gaps (poor documentation and limited analysis). Other factors that affect the accuracy of data from OB records in the priority police stations include lack of uniform categorisation violence data, and variations in guidance available on recording violent incidents; Also, some police stations used several OB records while there were different levels of willingness by community members to report an incident to the police. Insights from relevant literature (especially the IPOA Report published in May 2019) and insights from key informants and FGDs have been used to beef up findings on forms and prevalence of violence nationally and in the target counties.



⁶ In efforts to mitigate this gap, the county survey team succeeded in carrying out Police commander interviews and police station observations at Turbi Police Station. This station falls within the same sub-county as North Police Station. The data from Turbi Police Station forms a control group for Marsabit County.

⁷ Regarding this issue, data were collected on Laisamis and Turbi Police stations in Marsabit County, and Wamba Police station in Samburu County. This was in addition to the priority police stations targeted in the two counties. These data can serve as control group on police stations in the two counties.

⁸ Counterfactual refers to the situation or condition which hypothetically may prevail for individuals, organisations, or groups were there no development intervention. See, DAC 2010: Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results-Based Management.

BASELINE FINDINGS FROM PERFORMANCE INDICATORS ACROSS OUTPUTS



According to the World Bank Report on ease of doing business 2019, Kenya is ranked position **56** among **190** economies in the ease of doing business.

General Safety and Security Context

At the global level, Kenya is ranked position 119 out of 163 states in the 2019 Global Peace Index (GPI) report⁹. Kenya has consistently maintained an average score of 2.3 since 2015. On average, it has improved 1.8 points for the last 5 years except in 2016 and 2015 where it dropped by 2 and 1 point respectively. According to the GPI and Fragility State Index (FSI) Safety and security in Kenya is negatively affected by issues such as election violence, militarisation, ongoing inter-communal conflicts, uneven development and the impact of terrorism. Different forms of violence persist in the target counties and these can be grouped into five major categories: Criminal violence, inter-communal violence, violence against women and girls, violent extremism, and election violence¹⁰.

Investment Environment

According to the World Bank Report on ease of doing business 2019, Kenya is ranked position 56 among 190 economies in the ease of doing business. The ease of entry, access to funding, personal safety, security for property, and prospects for growth are some of the critical factors that affect decisions about investing in a given region or county. Safety of the person and property was particularly a key consideration for new and existing businesses in any given area. This section examines the state of investment environment in the target counties and nationally through a focus on two core elements: The extent of ease of doing business, and factors that promote or hinder entry and conduct of businesses.


Many of the study participants were of the view that the business environment was improving in the target counties and in Kenya generally. Some of the key informants from Laikipia County reported that the county was in the process of introducing a 24-hour economy. Although Marsabit County experienced serious security concerns which affected business, the participants in FGDs held in the county asserted that it was easier to invest and conduct normal trade within towns in the county as insecurity incidents were fewer compared to rural areas. The 'Soko Bora' initiative in Baringo County allowed anyone from anywhere to go and conduct business in the county.

However, some of the study participants identified a number of issues that undermined the ease of doing business in their areas. These included complaints of double taxation by the Kenya Revenue Authority and county governments, insecurity especially in the informal settlements of major towns, poor sanitation, and low returns on investment as a result of low market demand and higher costs of running business.

⁹ Institute for Economics & Peace. Global Peace Index 2019: Measuring Peace in a Complex World, Sydney, June 2019. Available from: <http://visionofhumanity.org/reports>.

¹⁰ All the different forms of violence that occur in the target counties can be grouped under the five categories. There were no other forms of violence in the catchments areas that did not reach the police stations.

Analysis and Recommendations



I. While data from FGDs and key informants reported incidences of illegal firearms, conflict triggered by scarcity of livelihood resources such as water and pasture due to climate change, drug abuse, unemployment¹¹, and inter-county migration, VAWG did not feature explicitly as a major safety and security concern in the household interviews across the counties. There was a tendency by survivors to 'hide' VAWG from the public (culture of secrecy), and normalisation of VAWG in many of the local communities. Moreover, rape during an election year may be reported as election violence and as rape or VAWG during a no-election period. The absence of VAWG nature/disaggregation of incidences across the VAWG spectrum means that there is need for the REINVENT Programme to work with stakeholder on how best to capture this missing data.



II. The assessment found property crimes, inter-communal conflict, political/ elections-related violence, cattle rustling, political violence and organized criminal gangs, violent extremism, conflict linked to development, inter-county boundary disputes, human-wildlife conflict, VAWG; resource-based conflict, and trafficking of persons and excessive use of force by security agencies to be prevalent in the Western Region, Rift Valley region, Upper Eastern and North Eastern regions. This calls for a concerted and integrated approach by the REINVENT team to address these issues across workstreams and consider the use of scalable interventions that are interconnected with existing efforts by both State and Non-State Actors.



III. Community perceptions of violence and levels of violence reported in police stations were largely contextual and bound to change from time to time. This means that low incidence of violence such as cattle rustling may be higher during another period when the context changed. Also, low numbers reported police station e.g. on election violence may be higher during an election cycle. The definition of violence within the official government records was also contextual, which could lead to different interpretations by different people. REINVENT Programme should consider developing an intervention that will help address data gaps in reporting crime and violence within police stations.



¹¹ Violence and crime in Kenya have been linked to youth joblessness and perceived socio-economic exclusion from economic opportunities. See, for example, UKAID (2017) Youth Employment in Kenya on; <https://www.google.com/>

State and non-state actors' collaboration in addressing various forms of violence

Level of violence in target counties

Five major categories of violence were reported in the target counties namely; criminal violence, VAWG, inter-communal violence, violent extremism, and election violence. The level of reporting of violence at the priority police stations by community members was low in all the counties, especially VAWG¹², Violent Extremism (VE), and election violence. A total of 1,430 cases of violence were recorded for October 2019 in the priority police stations and 19,467 cases for the calendar year November 2018-October 2019 with criminal violence leading with 16,240 incidences; VAWG 2,278; Inter/intra communal conflict 783; VE 23; and elections violence 10 incidences. Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) recorded 224 terror attacks between 2015 and 2019 (an average of 44.8 incidents per year). Table 1 shows a summary of community perceptions of trend in the prevalence of violence/crimes over the last three years.

Table 1: Community perceptions of trend in the prevalence of violence/crimes over the last three years

Type of violence/crime	Increased	Decreased	No change/Unsure
VAWG/Rape	20.3%	65.8%	13.9%
Cattle Rustling	29.5%	50.3%	20.2%
Land-based conflicts	36.9%	46.5%	16.6%
Ethnic/Land-based conflicts	12.2%	45.7%	42.1%
Election/political violence	18.7%	61.3%	20%
Petty crime	40%	50.6%	9.5%
Violent extremism/terrorism	16.4%	59.2%	24.2%
Violent robbery	28.9%	52.5%	18.6%

Household interviews indicated that the most common factor that contributed to the persistence of violence in the counties was high youth unemployment (29%), followed closely by high levels of poverty (21%). Other notable factors were lack of action against perpetrators (11%), endemic corruption (9%), scarcity of resources (9%), limited police capacity (6%), and retrogressive cultural practices such as cattle rustling and female genital mutilation (6%).

Community members across the study counties rated the level of professionalism among security agents (especially the police) in responding to crime/violence (including violent extremism, VAWG and election security) as low to moderate. 37.7% of HH respondents (40.8% male and 34.1% female) reported being satisfied with the professional conduct of safety and security service providers (including the police). Household respondents gave a high to very-high rating of police professionalism about dealing with petty crime (42.6%). This was followed by VAWG (41.3%), violent extremism (35.9%), and violent robbery (34.5%). Less than a third of the household respondents rated police professionalism about dealing with election/political violence (31.2%), ethnic and clan-based conflicts (27.6%), cattle rustling (26.6%) and land-based conflicts (25.9%) as high to very high (See Tables 14-21 in Annexure 11).

Only 38% of household respondents reported being satisfied (25%) or very satisfied (13%) with services delivered at the priority police stations. Of those who had reported cases at a police station, 49.7% were with either satisfied (32.6%) or very satisfied (17.1%) with the services they received (Table 12 and 13, Annexure 11). Counties in the Coast Region had the highest level of satisfaction (56.6%) with service provided at police stations, followed by Rift Valley (51.4%), Western (49.4%), Upper Eastern (47.2%) and North Eastern (38.3%) in that order. County analysis showed that Tana River County posted the highest level of the proportion of community members satisfied with police services (69.2%), while Mandera County had the lowest proportion (25%).

Coordination and Collaboration Between and Among State and Non-State Actors in Safety and Security Matters

Over twenty different categories of state and non-state actors were involved in efforts to improve safety, security and peace in the eighteen counties. These actors included national and county government agencies and officials, NGOs programmes, community peace committees, religious leaders and organisations, opinion leaders. (Annexure 12).

Laws, policies, and programmes of the National and County Governments, as well as of other key security sector actors

¹² Although absolute violence data showed it was the second most reported at police stations, there was consensus among key informants and community FGDs a lot more VAWG cases were not reported by victims or the duty bearers.

significantly influenced measures taken by the state and non-state actors (collectively referred to as duty bearers) and communities to improve safety and security. Notable policies in this regard include the policy framework and strategy for the re-organisation of the NPS¹³, United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325, and the Kenya National Action Plan (KNAP)¹⁴. Others are the National Policy on Peace Building and Conflict Management¹⁵, and the National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism (NSCVE)¹⁶.

Key informants and FGD participants in Mandera and Wajir counties noted that the county governments in the two counties had employed police reservists who complimented the efforts of the local police in tackling various forms of crime and violence. Moreover, most of the other target counties such as Mandera, Kwale, Mombasa, Kilifi, Lamu, Nakuru, Isiolo, Tana River, and Wajir County government had already developed action plans to deal with violent extremism. Community-level peace and security structures were mentioned as being notable actors. Key informants in Garissa County reported increased involvement of community stakeholders in the management of safety and security matters, which had contributed to improved safety and security situation in the county. In Samburu County, rangers in the community conservancies helped in tackling banditry. All county governments reported having developed County Action Plans (CAPs) on Countering Violent Extremism in collaboration with NSAs. Residents in Baringo County viewed the presence of specialised units (Anti-stock theft Unit, Rapid Deployment Unit, and Kenya Defence Forces) as a major boost to safety and security in the county. In counties where significant measures had been taken to tackle different forms of violence and crime, community members generally rated such measures as improved and/or more effective compared to the last 3 years.

Analysis and Recommendations



I. Security sector stakeholders including local communities faced a wide range of fairly similar challenges in their efforts to promote and maintain peace, safety, and security in the target counties. These challenges include mistrust between the community and police that hindered effective sharing of security information; low level of acceptance of officers by local communities, especially officers who hail from outside the communities; political interference in peace matters; influence of Government policy; poor infrastructure (road networks and street lights), and limited access to services. REINVENT Programme should consider using its influence at the National Police Reforms Secretariat and the National Police Service Commission to lobby for better working conditions for security providers.



II. In Upper Eastern and North Eastern regions, community members complained of a lack of confidentiality in reported cases which puts those that report at risk when their identity is revealed, while in some coastal counties such as Kwale limited cooperation between Muslims and Christians affected peace, safety and security interventions. REINVENT Programme should consider working together with IPOA and IAU to engender confidence in the public about reporting and whistleblowing against police excesses.



III. The establishment of gender and children desks within police stations also helped in tackling VAWG issues. Direct observation and interviews with police commanders showed that approximately 70% of the priority police stations had a functional gender and children desk¹⁷. The establishment of children courts by the judiciary was reported in Mombasa, Nakuru and Kisumu counties, representing a positive development in efforts to tackle some of the VAWG cases.

¹³ See <http://www.nationalpolice.go.ke/downloads/category/22-nps-information-restructuring-pack.html>

¹⁴ The KNAP titled 'Kuhusisha Wanawake ni Kudumisha Amani' ('to involve women is to sustain peace'), is anchored in the constitutional values of gender equality, inclusion, and participation. Pillar 1 specifically promotes 'Active and increased participation of women at all decision-making levels and in all institutions and mechanisms for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict.'

¹⁵ The policy is operationalised by the Sessional paper No 5 of 2014. It offers direction on peacebuilding interventions in Kenya including coordination of peace actors. See <https://www.counterterrorism.go.ke/library>

¹⁶ The Strategy offers the policy direction on minimising and or eradicating violent extremism by adopting public-facing approaches that complement the law enforcement, military and intelligence efforts by security practitioners.

¹⁷ A functional gender desk is one manned by at least an officer and specifically dedicated to receiving gender and children cases within the police station.



IV. Counties in North Eastern Region including Wajir and Mandera counties had recruited national police reservists, while in the Upper Eastern Region there were on-going efforts to recruit more conservancy rangers to boost community security. This is in addition to the establishment of more police stations and posts. However, not much has been done by state actors to address VAWG in this region because most of the cases were not reported.



V. Regarding the management of violent extremism, different state and non-state actors undertook capacity building on peace matters while agencies such as the NCTC trained the security personnel on strategies of countering terrorism. Community peace and security structures across the eighteen counties had received training and sensitisation on the need for vigilance and sharing of information with security agents. The counties had also developed county-level CVE action plans, although these were not fully implemented. REINVENT Programme has a chance to engage non state actors to check on implementation and functionality of County level CVE Action plans and produce positive stories of change.

Accountable and effective police (and other security agencies) addressing community security, violent extremism and election security.

Service Delivery at Priority Police Stations

Priority police stations/ violence data showed an under-reporting of violence in all counties. Police stations were not the main point of call for reporting incidences of violence in the target counties. Instead, community members reported crimes to a wide range of other formal security structures such as Nyumba Kumi, peace committees and local administrators as well as informal institutions such as village and clan elders as the first points of call. Community members only report reported to police stations when issues have not been adequately resolved at the above-mentioned levels. Consensus emerged in FGDs that the patriarchal nature of communities in many of the target counties and normalisation of violence against women and girls coupled with limited gender-specific services contributed significantly to under-reporting of VAWG. Factors that contributed to under-reporting of violence at police stations in the target counties ranged from distance to police stations to poor police-community relations.



According to the World Bank Report on ease of doing business 2019, Kenya is ranked position **56** among **190** economies in the ease of doing business.

Similarly, household interviews showed that only 23.2% of household respondents across the counties had reported an incidence of violence to a police station within the November 2018 – October 2019 period (Figure 32, Annexure 11). Only in the Western Region where nearly half (49.5%) of household respondents had reported crime in a police station in the past 12 months. The vast majority of households had not: 84.1% in Upper Eastern Region, 80.8% in North Eastern Region, 74.7% in Rift Valley Region, 69.9% in Coast Region and 50.4% in Western Region (Table 9, Annexure 11).

County level analysis showed that none of the households interviewed in Lamu County had reported crime at a police station in the past 12 months. A similarly high proportion of households interviewed in Marsabit County (91.5%), Garissa County (87%), Kwale County (87%), Isiolo County (84.6%), and Mandera County (82.6%) had not reported a case of crime to a local police station within the last 12 months. However, more than half of households interviewed in Kisumu (58.9%) had reported a case of crime to a police station with the 12 months preceding the study compared to 41.1% who had reported.

Key reform priorities adopted across the priority police stations included the unified command structure, uniforms (although only a few officers had it), and progressive improvements on tooling with requisite equipment including vehicles and housing allowance for officers. Although the provision of allowance to police officers enabled them to rent alternative accommodation outside of the police stations, there were reservations regarding this issue. Some of the police commanders engaged in the study felt that this arrangement posed an operational challenge as affected the "emergency strength" of



41 stations (70%) of the priority police stations had functional gender and children desk, of which 27 of them (65.9%) were in own separate room, while seven (17%) others were detached from the main police station block. A total of 37 (65%) priority police stations lacked a copy of the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) on gender-based violence.

a police station.” A police commander elaborated this point in the following manner:

Data management at the priority stations was problematic across all the counties. None of these police stations had adopted the digital Occurrence Book recently launched by the Inspector General of Police (IG)¹⁸ but kept a manual Occurrence Book (OB). The study revealed that some of the officers altered data or plucked out pages from manual OB which undermined the successful prosecution of cases in court. It was observed that some police stations would go for hours without the OB when it was being presented in court for reference. Recording of information on the OB was hard to follow. In some cases, critical data such as the age of survivors or accused persons was missing. In busy police stations, there were several volumes of the OB for a calendar year, whose information was not properly processed or summarised.

None of the police stations had a digital occurrence book, eight (14%) had dedicated spaces for people with special needs, while five police stations (8.7%) had other facilities and services for people with special needs. Further, 41 stations (70%) of the priority police stations had functional gender and children desk, of which 27 of them (65.9%) were in own separate room, while seven (17%) others were detached from the main police station block. A total of 37 (65%) priority police stations lacked a copy of the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) on gender-based violence.

Interviews with police commanders indicated that the unified command structure improved efficiency in service delivery at police stations built the capacity of officers who were previously in the Administration Police (AP), and helped to streamline police operations.

Community perceptions on the level of effectiveness of the police in their duties showed a moderate rating, with remarkable variation in perception noted across the counties. 57.5% of HH respondents (55.8% males and 59.2% females) reported being satisfied with measures taken by safety and security service providers (including the police) to effectively deal with violence. Many of the household respondents in Isiolo, Laikipia, Samburu, Wajir, Tana River, Bungoma, and Kisumu counties were of the view that there was a notable improvement in police officers’ performance of their duties.

At the same time, the household respondents from these counties felt a considerable number of police officers engaged in a variety of malpractices and crime which undermined the level of efficiency, effectiveness, the professionalism of the police as well as police-public relations¹⁹. These included slowness in responding and handling of cases reported to them (lethargy), incidences of corruption (e.g. releasing of culprits after receiving a bribe), and generally poor relationship with community members. These behaviours made community members feel a less valuable part of the security stakeholders.

Concerning violent extremism and election violence, only very few incidences of these crimes were reported in police stations during the November 2018 to October 2019 period. However, insights from key informants showed that far more incidences of these two categories of violence occurred in some of the counties during the same period. For example, it is well known that there were several terrorist attacks in Mandera during the November 2018 and October 2019 period yet the priority police stations data in the county showed zero incidents of violent extremism in the county

¹⁸ Standard Media, 2019. Inspector General launches digital OB in a bid to guarantee transparency in police service <https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001350391/muyambai-launches-digital-occurrence-book>. Also, see,

¹⁹ This issue is not unique to the counties. Media reports show numerous instances across the country where police officers engage in crime or misuse their power. For example, see the following articles: Two police officers among suspects shot dead in botched robberies in Nairobi, Cyrus Ombati, 24 November 2019, <https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001350665/police-officers-among-suspects-gunned-down-in-botched-nairobi-robberies>; Over 600 police officers engaged in crime this year, Ordon Osen, 19 December 2019, <https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2019-12-19-over-600-police-officers-engaged-in-crime-this-year/>

over this period. These incidents were possibly classified within criminal violence. Also, the police stations’ violence data revealed inconsistencies in classification of incidences of violent extremism in some of the counties. According to police station commanders, incidences of violent extremism can also be categorised as criminal violence. There was also failure at the police station level to record cases on the hands of specialised forces such as ATPU, fear of reporting due to breached confidentiality and therefore harassment and intimidation of those who reported such incidences. Key informants in Mandera County were of the view that the anti-terror police should change the counter-terrorism strategy of fighting terrorism and instead improve the gathering of intelligence information by working with the local communities, the youth and all stakeholders including non-state actors.

State and non-state actors had cooperated in developing County Action Plans (CAPs) on Countering Violent Extremism in several counties including REINVENT counties of Kwale, Mombasa, Kilifi, Lamu, Tana River, Nakuru, West Pokot, Turkana, Isiolo, Garissa, Mandera, and Wajir. However, there is minimal to no progress made in implementing CAPs, many remain unaware of their existence. Some challenges in CAP implementation identified include limited to no resourcing of CAPs, inadequate communication between national and county level governments on CVE strategies, confusion/conflict over CAP ownership, inadequate political support for CAPs and limited roles/engagements of religious leaders.

There were also complaints that the police were “mean” on sharing information with the public and also hardly treated the information shared by the public as confidential. Some of the police officers reportedly became hostile to community members who volunteered information to them. Although several priority police stations had copies of the current Service Standing Orders (SSOs) and the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) on the management of gender-based violence, the copies were mostly under the custody of the station commanders. This implied that the SSOs and SOPs were not fully benefiting officers handling GBV cases. Also, many of the officers were yet to be trained on the SOPs.

Professional misconduct reported to police accountability institutions

70% of the community members in target counties were unaware of the police accountability institutions. More male (38%) than female members (23%) of local communities in target counties knew of police accountability institutions and where they could report cases of police misconduct²⁰ (Figure 37, Annexure 11). Among those who knew where to report cases of police misconduct, 52.5% indicated that they could report to police stations, followed by 25% to IPOA, 11% to KNHCR, 9.7% to EACC and 1.9% to IAU. As such police stations topped the list of institutions where concerns about the security issues could be reported with 63.8% in Upper Eastern, 60% in Western, 56.6% in Rift Valley and 55.9% in Coast. IPOA was mentioned by 39.9% of respondents in North Eastern (Table 22-24, Annexure 11).

A total of 3,237 complaints were received by Independent Policing Oversight Authority (IPOA) in the year 2018/19²¹. out of which, 728 had been investigated. Similarly, 1139 cases were received by Internal Affairs Unit (IAU) in 2019 out of which 198 (17%) were finalised. Overall, 55% of household interviews indicated that police officers socialised and related well with the local community. In the North-Eastern and Upper Eastern regions, 63% and 53% of household respondents respectively reported that police officers did not socialise or relate well with local communities. Relatively more household respondents from Western Region (71%), Rift Valley Region (67%) and Coast Region (57%) had a similar view.

²⁰ See, IPOA Performance Report

This includes the RE-INVENT Inception Assessment concluded in September 2019

²¹ See, IPOA Performance Report

Key stakeholders (political, security, community, religious and civil society) working together to counter diverse threats from violent extremism

Insights from key informant interviews, FGDs, and available literature²² indicated that pertinent forms of violent extremism in the target counties included terrorist attacks and the temporary occupation of local areas by militants. In addition, the threat was said to manifest itself in the form of radicalisation. In some cases, respondents conflated the activities by criminal gangs with those of violent extremist organisations. Frequently, fear was expressed regarding the intensions by youth that were reported to have returned from Somalia. Combined, these issues undermined prospects for peace, safety and security in the affected areas. Incidences of violent extremism were cited mostly in key informant interviews and FGDs held in Coast and North Eastern regions, notably in Mandera, Wajir, Garissa, Kwale, Mombasa, Kilifi, Lamu, Nakuru, Isiolo, Tana River, and Bungoma counties.

State and non-state actors in Mandera, Kwale, Mombasa, Kilifi, Lamu, Nakuru, Isiolo, Tana River, and Wajir counties had cooperated in developing county action plans (CAPs) on Countering Violent Extremism, in collaboration with other state and non-state actors, to address violent extremism. The County Action Plans on Countering Violent Extremism were identified in this study as one of the few government policies in which community members and non-state actors had participated during development and/or implementation.

Analysis and Recommendations



- I. The police station commanders gave several recommendations on how to improve police professionalism which included the following: need for police officers to interact more with the community through sporting and common community projects, police officers should dedicate more efforts to understand local communities better, carry out more security duties and field assignments, being polite to people they serve and undergoing more intensive professional training. The station commanders also emphasised the need for police officers to be neutral while handling cases, police to put more effort to learn local culture to avoid offending civilians, consider opinions of locals in curbing crime, ensure quick response to crime, and seek to gain the full trust and support of community members.



- II. Personal, community and institutional level factors influenced community members against filing complaints against police officers, even when they knew at least one institution they could report to. These reasons included threats to people who report, the perception that IPOA was an ineffective institution, fear of victimisation, language barrier, ignorance, and distance to the police accountability institutions. IPOA should create more awareness on their mandate and put measures to further protect people who report cases of police misconduct.



- III. Variations in community perceptions on police-community relations were evident across all counties. This could be attributed to contextual factors, individual officers' personalities, and nature of security agents' operations in the counties. Key informant interviews (especially with CSOs) indicated that the use of excessive force by the police during demonstrations or after terror attacks where they treated every citizen as a suspect served to erode gains made in improving police-public relations. These behaviours may be as a result of poor training of police officers on how to respond in such circumstances²³.



- IV. There is need to generate additional insights on the form, extent, trends, and specific hotspots of violent extremism in each of the eighteen counties with an emphasis on Coast and North Eastern regions. This may necessitate the identification and analysis of credible secondary sources of data on violent extremism, as well as conducting discreet community level key data collection exercises targeted at individuals and institutions in the target counties who are knowledgeable and willing to share relevant information. RE-INVENT's violence monitoring tool and the CVE work stream's research objectives should go a significant way towards filling these gaps.

Agency of Women and Girls in Peace, Safety, and Security

There was widespread recognition by community members (both men and women) that gender justice was necessary for maintaining peace and security and agency as measured by visibility, clout, power, and voice of women in peace and security. 65% of HH respondents (64% males and 65.8% females) reported there was no general preference to educate boys than girls. 72% of HH respondents (71.7% males and 72.6% females) felt women should, like men, hold leadership position.

Women's views were fairly represented in safety and security matters across the counties, as reflected in the views of 51% of the household interviews while 35% were of a contrary view and 4% were not sure of fair representation of women. Regionally, slightly over half of respondents in Upper Eastern (50.4%) said that women's views were not fairly represented in safety and security, a view shared by 45.2% in North Eastern, 30.5% in Rift Valley, 28.7% in Western and 21.9% in Coast reporting. Across counties, Turkana County had the highest number (66.2%) saying women's views were represented while Mandera had the least (29.6%) (See figure 39 and Table 28 in Annexure 11).

On whether women were adequately involved in discussions about safety and security in their community 49% said yes while 40% were of the contrary view. Another 11% were not sure. At the regional level, more respondents from Upper Eastern Region (55.2%) indicated that women are not adequately involved in discussions on safety and security, a view shared by 53% in North Eastern, 28% in Coast, 34.1% in Rift Valley and 33.6% in Western. Western, Rift Valley and Coast had more respondents, averaging about 55% who indicated that women were involved adequately in the discussions.

Despite robust laws to curb Female genital mutilation/cut (FGM) and child marriage, the prevalence is still high. According to the 2014 Kenya Demographic Health Survey (KDHS), 21% of women and girls, aged 15-49, have undergone some form of FGM. 23% of Kenyan girls are married before the age of 18 while 4% are married before the age of 15. However, there exist few champions at county level who are addressing negative patriarchal norms and structures including child marriage and FGM.

Analysis and Recommendations



- I. In Isiolo County, all the household respondents (100%) felt that gender, as well as conflict sensitivity, were not considered when designing and implementing development projects. In Laikipia County, some participants felt that some actors considered gender sensitivity while others did not. Sometimes it would trickle down from the fact that even the general public participation is not done and when done gender concerns were not adequately factored in.



- II. REINVENT Programme should consider developing more localized approaches to addressing patriarchy among pastoral communities and prone to resource based and inter communal conflicts. Similar sentiments were echoed in Turkana, Lamu and Isiolo, Bungoma Kisumu, Kilifi, Kwale Mombasa, Baringo Nakuru, and Marsabit counties where participants in FGDs and KII noted that even where women were involved it was often as a last option.



- III. Many study participants were not aware of policies proposed by women, mostly because of the patriarchal nature of the societies and the minimal participation of women in the decision-making processes. REINVENT Programme should work across National and county spaces to build the capacity of women in developing proposals that promote gender justice.



- IV. There are few women in decision making positions of peace and security structures and mechanisms at the higher levels of society, but at the community level, there is participation in leadership of self-help groups, nyumba kumi, church groups, other informal groups. REINVENT Programme should consider not just raising the numbers of women involved in safety and security structures but also increasing their voice, clout, agency and impact in these spaces.

²² This includes the RE-INVENT Inception Assessment concluded in September 2019.

²³ See for example; <https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001339404/report-shows-poor-police-training-of-anti-riot-officers>

Intra and inter institutional commitment to address the root causes and drivers of conflict.

CSD was implied in the compulsory Environmental and Social Impact Assessments (ESIA) required of all projects by the National Environment Management Authority (NEMA). However, CSD principles was neither well understood nor applied in development planning nor design.

The household interviews showed 65% of the respondents were not aware of development projects in their areas. In Western and Rift Valley, almost half of the respondents were aware of major development projects in their areas. North Eastern had the largest proportion of those who were not aware of any projects with 85.3% of household respondents, followed by 70% in Upper Eastern and 61% in the Coast regions. The commonly mentioned projects include road construction, water projects, schools, dams, irrigation schemes, and abattoir construction. The specific interventions included Tullow Oil Exploitation in Turkana County, GDC in Baringo County, Northern Rangeland Trust Conservancies in Samburu and Laikipia counties, Standard Gauge Railway Dry Port project in Nakuru County, Maasai Mau Forest Rehabilitation works in Narok County, Limestone extraction in West Pokot County, Dams in the Rift Valley, and the LAPSSSET projects in Coast, Upper Eastern and North Eastern regions.

A majority (81%) of household respondents indicated that they were not consulted or involved in any discussion on the impact of the medium to large scale projects in their counties. This was reflected in the results of all the regions. In the North-Eastern Region, 96% were not consulted or involved before any projects began²⁴, and this was also the case for 86% in Upper Eastern, 83% in Coast, 72% in Rift Valley and 66% in Western. Among the few (19%) that reported to have been consulted and involved, issues discussed included the benefits of the project (52%), opportunities for employment of community members (27%), the possible negative impact of the project (12%) and possible relocation (8%).

81%

A majority (81%) of household respondents indicated that they were not consulted or involved in any discussion on the impact of the medium to large scale projects in their counties. This was reflected in the results of all the regions.



24 This finding mirror report by DDG on Conflict Sensitive Development Assessment for Wajir County in January 2019.



In Kilifi County, salt harvesting along the Gongoni-Marereni coastal road employed the locals although a major source of land-related conflict.

Various development interventions across the target areas have triggered community discontent which, if not properly managed would result in new forms of conflicts or exacerbate existing ones. In other counties, existing conflicts negatively impacted on development. In Baringo County, for example, key projects include the Geothermal Development Company (GDC) at Paka, Silale Intex mining at Tiaty, and Diatomite mining at Ribko which people said they are yet to benefit them.

In Bungoma County, the construction of the proposed Musikoma-Kanduyi road has been a bone of contention among civil societies and other actors in the county due to the road being classified as a national road under the Kenya Highway Authority. Business people who were being affected by the expansion of the road felt aggrieved for being excluded in the public participation meetings to be sensitised about the project and how it would affect them. The milk processing and Irish potato plants were planned to be started in Webuye East Sub County and not in Mt. Elgon area²⁵ which was perceived to produce more potatoes and milk than any other area in the county. The residents of Mt. Elgon felt that the choice of locations of the project was politically influenced to malign them. The study participants reported these complaints had not been addressed.

In Kilifi County, salt harvesting along the Gongoni-Marereni coastal road employed the locals although a major source of land-related conflict. The locals felt cheated with the way the compensation for land was done. This was not resolved since the developers were reported to be influential people within the government. Moreover, buildings were brought down along the Mombasa Kilifi highway in the name of expanding the highway. However, community members complained that no meaningful expansion took place and their source of livelihoods has been greatly interfered with. A water project meant to provide water to the locals implemented by both the County Government and the National Government had worsened the water problem as the existing water pipes were pulled out and others installed, which left no water running.

In Tana River County, there were complaints against projects such as the Galana Kulalu irrigation scheme where the community complained they missed out on job opportunities and that only people from outside the county benefited from employment in the scheme. The pastoralists also raised complaints that the scheme was denying their animals land for grazing and water. This issue had not been addressed.

Turkana County has over the years been up in arms over the Lamu Port South Sudan Ethiopian Transport (LAPSSET) corridor project, wind power project, infrastructure projects and oil and gas exploration. Much of the discontent resulted from unmet community expectations in Turkana South and Turkana East sub-counties. Women, children, herders and the elderly were the most vulnerable group affected primarily because of displacement, distraction, blockage of migratory routes, social adjustment, and change of natural resource dependency and erosion of livelihood.

There were mega-development projects underway in Lamu County extending to Turkana initiated by the national government. The Lamu Port was one of the projects and was under construction with the first berth completed and was set to be officially opened. Some of the study participants complained of not being involved in the project and had a feeling of being alienated. According to respondents, immigrants were taken into work in the project leaving out the locals. This is a situation that created a drift and ill-feeling among the community towards the immigrant communities. Some of the key informants acknowledged that this ought to have been handled better, although the contractor wanted to cut costs by employing people who were already skilled. One of the ways to address the grievances was availing employment opportunities in the LAPSSET project to local people especially the youth. This would ensure youth were engaged in productive economic opportunities barring them from

25 See Media reports; <http://farmbizafrika.com/machinery/2146-bungoma-county-to-build-a-sh140m-milk-processing-plant-to-improve-area-dairy-farming>

engaging in vices that infringed on safety and security in the county.

BBI has been identified as a double-edged sword that has capacity to promote cohesion and also create division if not managed carefully. SDG 16 has been reflected in national frameworks to a minimal extent with the effect being that the exchequer has failed to commit funds in support of the structures and initiatives. There are other protracted conflicts across the target region which impacted on development. These included resource-based conflicts (land for grazing animals and water), political contestations, inter-clan/tribal conflicts (more pronounced in Samburu and Marsabit), gender-based violence, cattle rustling, land conflicts, and boundary conflicts, inter-clan conflicts as a result of disputes of boundaries, pasture, and water. These were common between the Ajuran and Degodia clans²⁶.

There were varied and mixed responses and views from the participants across all regions and 18 counties regarding the extent to which state and non-state actors practiced these principles. In Isiolo County, all the household respondents (100%) felt that gender, as well as conflict sensitivity, were not considered when designing and implementing development projects. In Laikipia County, some participants felt that some actors considered gender sensitivity while others did not. Sometimes it would trickle down from the fact that even the general public participation is not done and when done gender concerns were not adequately factored in. In Marsabit and Samburu counties, key informants observed that because of the existing chauvinist culture and the human rights awareness, the majority of the participants asserted that most actors would involve and try to incorporate gender issues but hardly do most of them carry out a comprehensive gender sensitivity analysis before implementing a project. Similar sentiments were echoed in Turkana, Lamu and Isiolo, Bungoma Kisumu, Kilifi, Kwale Mombasa, Baringo Nakuru, and Marsabit counties where participants in FGDs and KII noted that even where women were involved it was often as a last option. In Samburu County, the FGD respondents indicated that gender equality is often a consideration in projects, but it never gets to materialise due to negative cultural beliefs and practices of the community.

Major conflicts in the target counties were fairly similar and include perennial inter-communal conflict over access and rights to resources such as land, water and pasture; intra-communal conflict over land, power and other resources; and conflict between community members and development interventions revolving around access and utilisation of resources and distribution of benefits accrued from such development interventions. There are persistent inter-clan and inter-tribal conflicts in many of the counties, driven by political supremacy battles especially during electoral periods. Unresolved land and boundary disputes in all the counties perpetuated inter-communal conflicts and insecurity, while there was emergence or regrouping of militia groups linked to land squabbles especially in the Western Region.

Local conflicts around natural resources may be triggered or exacerbated by climate-related factors, particularly in economies that are highly dependent on natural resources (Sida, 2018). Climate change introduces an additional uncertainty into existing vulnerabilities, particularly in the ASALs which cover over 80 per cent of the country. (Kenya National Adaptation Plan, 2015-2030).

Available literature suggests numerous interventions aimed at supporting peacebuilding efforts across much of the target area. These included interventions by the REINVENT predecessor, Jamii Thabiti programme in Wajir, Mandera, Kilifi, Kwale Baringo and Bungoma counties for example²⁷. There was consensus among the study participants that there have been numerous past interventions on peacebuilding, which led to improved management of some of the protracted conflicts.

²⁶ Results mirror findings of a survey by Danish Deming Group (DDG) on Conflict Sensitive Development Assessment for Wajir County in January 2019

²⁷ Visit Jamii Thabiti Website on: <https://www.jamiithabiti.com/>

Analysis and Recommendations



- I. Most state and non-state actors conducted activities relevant to the CSD agenda such as public participation activities, and social and environmental impact assessments. However, these actors did not adequately apply the CSD principles and best practices in their work. The REINVENT Programme should put in place a major CSD and conflict sensitivity advocacy programme to work around public participation among communities on intended development interventions to minimize the eruption of tensions/conflicts.
- II. Despite conflict-sensitive development being a major security concern in all the target counties, it appeared key duty bearers²⁸ were not doing enough to address the issue effectively. REINVENT Programme should establish a robust training programme for security actors and key duty bearers on how to engage with communities during the inception phase of medium and large-scale development interventions.
- III. The study data indicated a consensus that many of the development actors focused mainly on achieving positive results of their work (programme outcomes/benefits) without paying attention to the negative consequences of their activities. REINVENT Programme should consider establishing or working around existing multi stakeholder technical groups, platforms to introduce Conflict Sensitivity Analysis (CSA) and an integrated approach to development.
- IV. The cost of undertaking comprehensive CSA (involving extended community dialogues) was also a key challenge in achieving desired levels of conflict sensitivity by state and non-state actors. This has led to the CSD concept to remain largely a theoretical term rather than a practical approach. REINVENT Programme should consider developing technical resources- handbooks, case studies, policy briefs, and how to guides to popularize CSD.
- V. Concerning state-funded programmes, political interference often interfered with community-level engagements. Often, elites and institutions to control of decision-making processes²⁹, which denied ordinary community members the opportunity to demand and negotiate effectively with implementers of development interventions in pursuit of their rights, interests, and entitlements. REINVENT Programme through the Election Security Programme should consider developing advocacy and community sensitization forums that will enable communities to be aware of politicization of development projects.
- VI. The main challenge the NSAs have to deal with in applying conflict and gender sensitivity as reported in all the four regions is culture, which influences the value that the community attaches to what might be affected by the projects. Culture was a common hindrance in Isiolo, Marsabit Samburu, Mandera, Wajir, Turkana, Baringo, and Lamu counties. Other common challenges were retrogressive attitudes and norms, inadequate resources, high illiteracy levels, high poverty levels, increased corruption, and community initial resistance to change. REINVENT Programme working with the VAWG and peacebuilding workstreams should consider developing knowledge and awareness interventions around Conflict, Culture and development interventions for better community engagement.

²⁸ These include national government and county government agencies, departments and officials responsible for regulating and monitoring the design and implementation of development interventions and governance processes.

²⁹ This alludes to the concept and practice of elite and institutional capture of the development space by powerful stakeholders. For further discussion on the prevalence and effects of elite and institutional capture of the development space and decision-making processes in Kenya, see Runguma, SN (2014), The Political economy of poverty reduction in Kenya: The case of two rural counties.

Knowledge and Evidence Generated and Disseminated to Enhance Community and Institutional Learning and Adaptation

There is a dearth of secondary data on the RE-INVENT Programme indicators due to a lack of recent security studies/research in the target counties. The vast majority of the study participants were not aware of any security study conducted in the surveyed counties during the last three years.

A major complaint received from community members who were interviewed in one or more research was the fact that most of those researchers never gave feedback or participants' views were not taken into consideration

IMPLICATIONS

- I. REINVENT Programme knowledge documentation work should establish a robust collaboration framework to capture as learning lessons the interventions across workstreams and outputs especially by safety and security providers including the Police, nyumba kumi, and peace committees; support for police reforms agenda; and enhancing police-community relations.
- II. Other opportunities include utilization of *Most Significant Change*³⁰ approaches to document the activities that REINVENT Programme directly or through partners will contribute especially tackling root cases of conflict, climate change impacts in the ASALs; strengthening local structures for peace and alternative dispute resolution mechanisms such as council of elders and strengthening of early warning and early response systems for addressing major conflicts.



CONCLUSION

Regional and intra-regional variations emerge on many of the variables, indicating a need for regional and county-specific targeting of RE-INVENT Programme activities. These variations also reinforce the need for paying attention to contextual factors, workstream specific dynamics, and disaggregation of the monitoring data by county.

The causes of tensions, violence and major conflicts in the target counties, are linked to a variety of socio-economic, political and structural factors. These conflicts, especially those associated with competition for scarce resources (e.g. water and pasture during prolonged droughts) prevail across most of the target counties. The causes and effects of major conflicts in the counties are diverse, multi-faceted and inter-connected and therefore require holistic and system thinking approaches to address them effectively within the available resources.

Some of the performance indicators require adjustment to achieve clarity and ease of measurement. Effective mechanisms will also be needed throughout the implementation period to track changes in the baseline values presented in this report and progress made on the targets established in the individual performance indicators.


The observed multiplicity of security actors (both state and non-state actors) in the eighteen counties alludes to a form of “crowding” within the security sector. The findings show these actors are not necessarily effective in coordinating and collaborating in tackling violence and security. Safety, security and peace interventions by many of the actors tend to be reactive and un-coordinated. Strikingly, a vast majority of community members engaged in this study, including those in counties where Jamii Thabiti was implemented, had limited knowledge of the role of NSAs in the formulation and implementation of policies, laws, and programmes aimed at improving safety and security in the target counties¹. This indicates a need for awareness-raising activities across all the eighteen counties.

Accurate Police station violence data, especially on violent extremism, election violence and VAWG are not currently available at the priority police station. There are cases where cases of VAWG may be recorded under criminal violence, as it is not always clear whether an assault case against a woman should necessarily be classified as VAWG. The various weaknesses in service delivery, data management and other aspects of police reforms This underscores the need for targeted capacity building activities at the police station level, as well as a need for the development of a police station reforms index to aid the RE-INVENT Programme to effectively track progress achieved in all activities carried out at the police station level.

¹ , However, this does not mean that NSAs were not involved in supporting or influencing the formulation and implementation of security sector policies/laws and decision-making processes. Indeed, NSAs' input and the role was mentioned, with examples, by some of the key informants as well as in some of the literature reviewed.

ANNEXES

- Annexure 1: RE-INVENT Programme Logframe
- Annexure 2: Baseline Survey Questions
- Annexure 3: Baseline Survey Sampling Plan
- Annexure 4: RE-INVENT Priority Police Stations
- Annexure 5: Qualitative Data Analysis Framework
- Annexure 6: Data Collection Tools
- Annexure 7: Documents Reviewed
- Annexure 8: Reported Cases of Violence at Priority Police Stations
- Annexure 9: Performance Indicators dashboard
- Annexure 10: Study Participants Summary Details
- Annexure 11: Relevant Tables and Figures (Household Survey)
- Annexure 12: Major safety and security actors



ABOUT US

Reducing Insecurity and Violent Extremism in the Northern and Coastal regions of Kenya (REINVENT) is a £20m 5-year programme that aims to enhance Kenyan capacity and capability to address inter-communal conflict, weak community-police relations, violence against women and girls (VAWG), violent extremism and election related violence. It will support the continued advancement of police reforms to improve the management, oversight and accountability of the police force. The programme is delivered by TetraTech International Development in partnership with the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI) and the Danish Demining Group (DDG) builds on the experience of the Jamii Thabiti Programme (2014-19), also known as the Kenya Improving Community Security Programme (ICS), and expands DFID support across more counties. It supports new areas of work including conflict sensitivity, pastoral livelihoods and combating violent extremism.

Impact of the programme:


Improved community safety and security as measured by effect on inclusive and equitable development, investment and service delivery in Kenya

Envisaged outcome of the programme:

Improved state and non-state actors' collaboration in a mutually accountable and inclusive manner to respond effectively to root causes of violence.

Programme outputs:

- Increased practice of accountability to build police (and other security agencies) effectiveness when addressing community security, violent extremism and election security.
- Strengthened agency of women and girls in peace, safety and security
- Intra and inter institutional commitment to address the root causes and drivers of conflict
- Knowledge and evidence generated and utilised to enhance community and institutional learning and adaptation.



If you have any questions or inquiries about the report, please reach out to us:

REINVENT Programme | Tetra Tech International Development

4th Floor, Prosperity House, Westlands Road

Email: reinventkenya@tetrattech.com

P.O Box 19084-00100

Twitter: ReinventKenya | Facebook: Reinvent Programme | Instagram: reinventkenya

